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Abstract
We characterize the dynamics of relative house prices, housing sales, construction
rates and population growth in response to city￿ speci￿c income shocks for 106 US cities.
We then develop a dynamic search model of the housing market in which construction,
the entry of buyers, house prices and sales are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Our theory generates dynamics that are qualitatively consistent with our empirical
observations and a version of the economy calibrated to match long-run features of
the housing market in U.S. cities o⁄ers a substantial quantitative improvement over
similar models with no search. In particular, variation in the time it takes to sell a
house (i.e. the house￿ s liquidity) induces house values and transaction prices to exhibit
momentum, or serially correlated growth.
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11 Introduction
We explore the consequences of time-consuming search and matching for the dynamics of
house prices, sales, and construction. First, we characterize the impact of city-speci￿c
income shocks on the short-run dynamics of average house prices, home sales, construction
and population growth for a panel of U.S. cities. We then develop a model in which the entry
of new buyers and the construction of new houses in response to such shocks are endogenously
determined. Our theory generates short term momentum (i.e. serially correlated growth
rates) for house prices and construction, even if income is strictly mean-reverting following
shocks. When calibrated to data on U.S. cities our model accounts for over 80% of the
variance of house price movements driven by city-speci￿c income shocks and a smaller, but
nevertheless substantial share of the observed autocorrelation of house price growth.
In our empirical analysis, we estimate a structural panel VAR with city-level observations
and use it to isolate the joint dynamics of relative prices, housing sales, construction and
population growth in response to persistent shocks to local income. We focus on prices and
conditions at the city level because, as a number of authors have noted, a major share of
the time-series variation in house prices is local in nature, rather than national.1 This has
motivated several researchers to use local factors such as income, regulations and construction
costs to account for price movements.
We ￿nd that housing market dynamics in U.S. cities can be characterized by several key
facts, some of which are consistent with those documented by other authors using di⁄erent
methods and data. Firstly, house prices are volatile relative to per capita incomes. Moreover,
at the city-level house price appreciation is much more volatile than a standard asset pricing
model would predict for a simple claim to local per capita income. Secondly, there is
strong positive serial autocorrelation in house price appreciation over the short term, but
mean reversion in prices over longer periods.2 Thirdly, sales growth is volatile relative
to income and is positively autocorrelated with, but lags, population growth. Fourthly,
population growth rates are more volatile than construction rates, especially in the short
run. Finally, construction rates are more persistent than population growth rates and both
are substantially more persistent than income ￿ uctuations.
Some of these observations have been documented previously, but never to our knowledge
1This has been documented for the U.S. by Abraham and Hendershott (1996), Del Negro and Otrok
(2006) and Glaeser et al. (2010), and for Canada by Allen, Amano, Byrne and Gregory (2007).
2See also Abraham and Hendershott (1996), Capozza, Mack and Mayer (1997), Malpezzi (1999) and
Meen (2002).
1in a uni￿ed study of city-level data. In any case, it has been noted, for example by Capozza,
Hendershott and Mack (2004), that a behavioral theory which accounts for them has proved
di¢ cult to construct. In particular, the fact that house price appreciation exhibits substantial
autocorrelation appears to be inconsistent with an asset-pricing approach in which houses
are treated as simple claims to local incomes and/or rents. For example, Case and Shiller
(1989) argue that serial correlation in rents cannot explain momentum in price changes (see
also Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1991). Glaeser et al. (2010) ￿nd that while a dynamic
rational expectations model of housing with endogenous construction can generate long-run
mean reversion, it ￿fails utterly at explaining high frequency positive serial correlation of
price changes.￿
Several authors have argued that there are good reasons to suspect that search and
matching play important roles in housing markets. For example, both the observed positive
aggregate co-movement of prices and sales (Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos, 2007) and the fact
that prices and sales are negatively correlated with average time on the market (Krainer,
2008) are broadly consistent with search theories of housing markets. Moreover, as ￿rst
noted by Peach (1983) and more recently documented by Caplin and Leahy (2008), there
is signi￿cant negative correlation between vacancies and price appreciation. Diaz and Jerez
(2012) suggest that movements in the division of surplus between buyers and sellers driven
by changes in the tightness of housing markets (as is predicted by competitive search theory)
may be a signi￿cant source of ￿ uctuations in house prices.
In light of the above literature, we construct a framework that introduces search and
matching into a housing market, in which both the entry of new buyers and the construction
of new houses evolve endogenously. The value of living in a particular city is determined by
an exogenous housing dividend in the form of the income that can be earned locally relative
to that in other locations. New buyers enter a city whenever the expected value of doing
so exceeds their next best alternative. These entrants require housing. They initially rent,
but many then search for houses to buy. This process takes time as agents must ￿nd the
￿right￿house which will yield utility to them individually. Exchange in the market for
residential housing is characterized by random search with entry of both buyers and sellers.
New houses are constructed and o⁄ered either for sale or for rent by pro￿t-maximizing
development ￿rms. Resident home-owners may also put their houses up for sale or rent
due to idiosyncratic shocks that either render them dissatis￿ed with their current house or
cause them to exit the city altogether. In our environment, we establish the existence of
a unique stationary growth path characterized by constant rates of population growth and
2construction.
We study the implications of city-speci￿c income shocks by calibrating our model to data
on U.S. cities. The theory generates short-term price momentum in equilibrium even in the
absence of persistent income growth (i.e. even if income follows a ￿rst-order auto-regressive
process). In the model, an increase in the value of living in a city spurs an immediate
increase in house search activity as households enter the city. It takes time, however, for
these buyers to ￿nd a house because of the matching friction, as well as for construction of
new housing to respond. To meet the immediate housing demands of new entrants, some
existing vacant houses are thus shifted to the rental market. As a result, the matching rate
for individual house buyers initially declines, while both sales and the rate at which houses
sell rise immediately. Therefore, although the value of house search begins to decline after
just one period (due to mean reversion in income), the tightness of the housing market (i.e.
the ratio of buyers to sellers) continues to rise for several more.
A tighter market results in houses selling more quickly. This ongoing increase in housing
market liquidity causes the expected re-sale value of housing to grow. Because the value of
houses in part re￿ ects this, current transaction prices grow in anticipation of easier future re-
sale. Over time, as income reverts to its long-run relative level, the stock of buyers declines
as entry slows and residents become home-owners. Higher home values induce increased
construction so that the decline in vacancies slows and is eventually reversed. The buyer￿
seller ratio, and hence housing liquidity, eventually fall. Therefore, after initially growing
for several periods, the house price falls in anticipation of a less tight market (and slower
re-sale) in the future, and eventually revert to its steady-state level.
Although a number of other researchers have studied the role of search and matching
in housing markets (e.g. Wheaton, 1990; Krainer, 2001; Albrecht at al., 2007; and Head
and Lloyd-Ellis, 2012), they have generally treated the aggregate housing stock as ￿xed,
and/or considered only steady-states. Caplin and Leahy (2008) consider the non-steady-
state implications of their model, assuming a ￿xed housing stock. In contrast, we focus on
the role of transitional dynamics of prices and construction of new homes in response to
shocks. Furthermore, we allow for the turnover of existing homes, which turns out to be
crucial for both the qualitative and quantitative nature of price and investment dynamics.
Finally, models of housing investment and construction (e.g. Davis and Heathcote, 2007)
generally abstract from search and matching in the market for houses in order to focus on
supply-side factors. In contrast, in this paper we bring together aspects of these di⁄erent
literatures in a uni￿ed framework.
3Our analysis is most closely related to those of Glaeser et al. (2010) and Diaz and Jerez
(2012). Glaeser et al. (2010) also study short-term dynamics driven by an estimated process
for city-level incomes in a model in which house prices re￿ ect the interaction between local
supply conditions and the willingness of households to pay to live in particular location.3
They do not, however, considers the role of housing liquidity associated with search and
matching in the housing market. The possibility of short-term price momentum and mean
reversion in prices and construction arises in Glaeser et al. (2010) only because of the
observed ￿hump-shaped￿pattern of relative incomes.4 Their model is to a signi￿cant extent
successful in accounting for short term volatility in prices and construction but fails to
generate short-term momentum in price appreciation and cannot account for volatility over
a longer time horizon.
Diaz and Jerez (2012) develop and calibrate a search model in which trade in houses
takes place because home-owners experience taste shocks which render them unsatis￿ed with
their current house (Wheaton, 1990). They study the impact of aggregate shocks to the
rate at which preferences change. They do not, however, consider endogenous construction
responses or either the entry or exit of buyers, all of which play important roles in our results.5
In their model, they ￿nd that competitive search can magnify the e⁄ects of exogenous changes
on house prices due to movements in the shares of surplus accruing to buyers and sellers.
In the context of our model, we ￿nd that allowing for this e⁄ect, by considering competitive
search and a matching function similar to theirs, does increase relative volatility, but only
at the expense of a substantial reduction in momentum.
Our empirical strategy isolates the e⁄ects of city-speci￿c income shocks. We explicitly
remove aggregate e⁄ects from the analysis by controlling for time-￿xed e⁄ects. In accordance
with this, we focus on a model with a large number of cities where the impact of shocks in one
has negligible e⁄ects on others. Although several recent papers develop models that allow for
cross-city interactions they limit their analyses in other ways. Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill
(2010) study the long-run implications of rising wage dispersion for housing price dispersion
in a model with cross-city migration and endogenous contruction. However, their model
does not feature search dynamics (and hence no distinction between owning and renting),
3In this respect these models build on the urban tradition of Alonso (1962), Rosen (1979) and Roback
(1982).
4Glaeser et al. (2010) also assume utility is decreasing in local population size which has a dampening
e⁄ect on prices. In their calibration, however, this e⁄ect is tiny so, in fact, that the shock process drives
everything.
5Diaz and Jerez (2012) quantitatively evaluate their model using aggregate, economy-wide data. In
contrast we study the role of city-speci￿c shocks.
4they do not study short-term price movements and they do not consider the implications
of their model for the empirical counterparts of construction, population growth and sales
growth at the city level. Karahan and Rhee (2012) study the interaction between illiquid
housing markets and labour market outcomes during the recent recession, in a model with
two representative cities. Again this paper does not try to account for city-level, short and
medium term movements in house prices, construction, population growth, sales, rents, etc.
Section 2 documents empirical features of the dynamics of housing markets at the city
level. Section 3 develops the basic model structure. In Section 4, a search equilibrium is
characterized and a deterministic steady-state derived. Section 5 presents both a baseline
calibration for our search economy and an alternative economy without search. Section 6
considers the dynamic implications of income shocks in the theory. Section 7 checks the
robustness of our main ￿ndings by examining three modi￿cations to the baseline search
economy. Section 8 concludes. Details regarding the data may be found in Appendix A and
all proofs and extended derivations are contained in Appendix B.6
2 Empirical properties of MSA housing markets
In this section, we characterize the joint dynamics of city-level income, house prices, house
sales, construction rates and population growth for a sample of 106 U.S. metropolitan sta-
tistical areas (MSA￿ s). Our data is annual and runs from 1981 through 2008. We provide
details on the data, including sources, in Appendix A. We focus on ￿ve variables: per capita
income at the city level, the level of house prices, growth in the sales of existing houses, the
growth rate of the housing stock, and population growth.7 Since we are interested in the
dynamics of city-level measures relative to those in other cities, we ￿rst transform the data
by removing common time e⁄ects. That is, we estimate a panel regression for each series
with time dummies and study the residual components.
2.1 A Structural Panel VAR
Relative movements in house prices, house sales, construction and city populations are likely
a⁄ected by many factors. Here we seek to isolate the dynamics that result from changes
6There are also two not-for-publication appendices, C and D.
7Our focus on these variables is largely driven by the availability of a reasonably long time series for a
large number of cities. Subsequently, we will consider the predictions of our model for other variables. As
we will show, the quantitative relationship between these ￿ve variables is robust to the inclusion of other
variables in a panel VAR.
5to income at the city level, which we interpret as a dividend to residence in the city. We
focus on such dynamics so as to be consistent with the theory we present in the next section.
In our theoretical model, when income in a particular city rises relative to the average, the
city￿ s rate of population growth also rises as households from outside move into the city to
take advantage of either the higher income itself or the factor(s) that caused it. Higher entry
drives housing demand above trend, puts upward pressure on house prices, and over time
spurs construction. As increased construction pushes costs higher and local income reverts
toward its trend, entry slows relative to construction. Eventually, house prices decline and
the city returns to its long-run trend.
Given that this is the theory we have in mind, we estimate a panel vector auto-regression




AiXct￿i + Fc + "ct; (1)
where Xct = [Yct;Pct;gS
ct;gH
ct;gN
ct]0 denotes the vector of the log of income per capita, the log
of house prices, sales growth, the growth rate of the stock of houses (cumulative permits) and
population growth in each city at each date.8 Here B and Ai are matrices of parameters, Fc





ct]0 contains the structural shocks.
To estimate the structural parameters of this model, we must impose a set of identifying
restrictions. Speci￿cally, we assume that the shocks are orthogonal and adopt a Cholesky de-
composition with the ordering indicated by the de￿nition of "c above. In particular, income
does not depend contemporaneously on any of the other variables and house prices depend
contemporaneously only on income. This ordering, which is consistent with the theory we
develop below, emphasizes the importance of shocks to fundamentals that a⁄ect current and
future income, as well as house prices, sales, construction, and population growth contempo-
raneously. It also allows for shocks to prices that have no contemporaneous e⁄ect on income,
but can a⁄ect sales, construction, population growth, and future income.9 Like our theory,
this ordering rules out shocks to current and future income that have no contemporaneous
e⁄ect on house prices.
8The fact that we use log levels of incomes and prices and growth rates of population and construction
is consistent with our theoretical analysis. However, in Appendix B we report the results of using growth
rates of all variables in the panel VAR. With this speci￿cation, the nature of the results remain unchanged.
9Note that gH
ct and gN
ct are growth rates going forward (i.e. gH
ct = lnHt+1 ￿ lnHt). Thus it seems
reasonable that these variables are able to respond to time t shocks to in income and prices. The relative
ordering of gH
ct and gN
ct in the system makes little di⁄erence to our results.
6We estimate equation (1) for T = 2 using the system GMM estimator proposed by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).10 This estimator is asymptotically
consistent when the number of panels becomes large for a given time-dimension, thereby
avoiding the incidental parameters problem associated with ￿xed-e⁄ects estimators (Nickell,
1981). There are several reasons for which we choose to focus on results using this estima-
tor rather than others. Firstly, it is generally found to outperform other standard GMM
estimators such as that of Arellano and Bond (1991) when the endogenous variables are per-
sistent.11 Secondly, its asymptotic properties are well understood and it has been extended
to the context of panel VARs by Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran (2005). Finally, the standard
￿xed￿ e⁄ect estimator has been found to exhibit a signi￿cant ￿nite-sample bias for samples
with similar dimensions to ours (i.e. moderately large time and panel dimension; see Judson
and Owen, 1999). There are, however, some potential pitfalls in using the system GMM
estimator in ￿nite samples. We discuss these in more detail in Appendix C and compare our
estimates to those generated using other methods.
A full set of parameter estimates from our baseline panel VAR is reported in Appendix
C. Here, Table 1 contains overall summary statistics. The ￿rst column shows the average
standard deviation of each series relative to that of the growth in per capita income. The
second column shows the correlation with per capita income growth and the third shows
the correlation with price growth. The remaining columns show the ￿rst four coe¢ cients of
autocorrelation.12
Several observations can be made based on Table 1. First, house prices and sales growth
are much more volatile than city-level incomes. Secondly, price changes are more persistent
than those of income growth, with a ￿rst-order autocorrelation of 0.56 as compared to 0.27.
Moreover, the level of house prices exhibits momentum. Thirdly, population growth rates
are more volatile on average than construction rates. Fourthly, construction rates are more
persistent than population growth rates and both, like price changes, exhibit substantially
more persistence than income. Finally, growth in the sales of existing houses at the city
10We have also estimated the system with more than two lags, although the results show little di⁄erence
from the two-lag case.
11Essentially, the system GMM estimator instruments the endogenous variables using lagged di⁄erences.
In fact, we adopt an alternative, but asymptotically equivalent approach which has been found to perform
better in ￿nite samples. Speci￿cally, we instrument levels with lagged deviations from the forward mean
of the remaining sample (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). As such the model is "just identi￿ed" (i.e. the
number of regressors equals the number of instruments), so that system GMM is numerically equivalent to
equation-by-equation 2SLS.
12In the table we report statistics for price growth, while the model is estimated using the level of house
prices.
7level are negatively correlated with price growth. This contrasts with others ￿ndings at the
aggregate economy-wide level.
Table 1: Moments from Panel VAR ￿ all shocks
Relative Corr. with Corr. with Autocorrelations
Std. Dev. Inc. growth Price growth year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4
Income growth 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.27 0.03 -0.06 -0.09
Price growth 2.75 0.43 1.00 0.56 0.24 0.02 -0.11
Sales growth 2.42 0.30 -0.26 0.63 0.37 0.23 0.15
Construction 0.28 0.26 0.34 0.75 0.49 0.28 0.14
Pop. Growth 0.49 0.27 0.10 0.39 0.31 0.17 0.10
Figure 1 depicts the implied impulse response functions for a shock to relative local
income together with the associated 95% con￿dence intervals.13 In response to the shock,
local income exhibits positively auto-correlated growth, peaking after one year, and is quite
persistent. The resulting movement in the relative house price exhibits considerably more
momentum, continuing to rise for three years before starting to revert to its mean. Mean
reversion is, however, more rapid overall for house prices than for income. After an initial
peak, sales growth slows quickly before rising again in the medium term. Population growth
responds immediately to the shock then slows down, whereas the construction rate responds
more sluggishly, peaking after two years. A key consequence of the latter is that the ratio
of city population to the housing stock rises and remains persistently high following a shock
to income.
Table 2: Moments from Panel VAR ￿ Income Shock only
Relative Corr. with Corr. with Autocorrelations
Std. Dev. Inc. growth price growth year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4
Income growth 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.03 -0.06 -0.09
Price growth 1.60 0.76 1.00 0.75 0.36 0.05 -0.15
Sales growth 1.32 0.56 0.01 0.59 0.39 0.35 0.35
Construction 0.11 0.55 0.80 0.88 0.61 0.33 0.11
Pop. growth 0.17 0.75 0.60 0.67 0.40 0.19 0.09
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Figure 1: Estimated Impulse Response Functions: Income Shock
These observations are quanti￿ed in Table 2, which reports statistics associated with the
e⁄ect of income shocks implied by the panel VAR. The unconditional standard deviation of
house prices generated by income shocks alone is more than half that observed in the data
overall (see Table 1 ). The persistence of house price movements generated by local income
shocks is, however, somewhat larger than what they exhibit overall. Similar statements hold
for sales, construction and population growth rates. In response to a shock to local income,
house price growth and sales growth are respectively about 60% and 32% more volatile than
income. In contrast, the construction rate exhibits only 11% as much volatility as income,
and population growth 17% as much. All four variables, however, exhibit substantially more
momentum than income in response to a shock to relative local income. Finally, the induced
9correlation in price growth and sales growth is close to zero.
In Appendix C, we report the results of re-estimating the panel VAR model for three re-
gional sub-samples. These regional groupings, corresponding to those considered by Glaeser
et al. (2010), are coastal cities within 100kms of a coastline, (non-coastal) sun-belt cities
and the remaining interior cities. While the parameter estimates naturally vary across sam-
ples, the general picture provided by the statistics in Table 2, is unchanged (see Table C2).
Moreover, the e⁄ects of a shock to local income, as depicted by the impulse responses in
Figure 1, are similar qualitatively for all sub-samples considered.
We also report the result of several alternative speci￿cations of the panel VAR. We con-
sider alternative de￿nitions of the key variables and alternative estimators. While parameter
estimates and moments vary, the general picture that emerges is robust across speci￿cations.
Interestingly, when we restrict the VAR so that income is assumed to follow a univariate
AR(2) process, the results are hardly changed. This suggests that feedback e⁄ects of the
other variables to per capita income are not very large and that, to a ￿rst approximation, it
may be reasonable to think of per capita income as an exogenous process.
2.2 Pricing a claim to local income
In Section 3 we develop a theory to determine the extent to which search and matching in the
housing market can account for volatility and momentum in house prices as well as persistent
movements in sales growth, construction rates and population growth, in response to shocks
to relative local income. Before doing so, however, it is useful to re￿ ect on the dynamics
of the price of a simple claim to local income, as this may serve as a useful benchmark for
evaluating the importance of the particular characteristics of houses in our theory and the
way we model the market for them.
If agents￿utility is linear in consumption (as it will be in our theory below), and if claims
to local per capita income, yt, are traded in a frictionless Walrasian market, then their price,
P L








where ￿ is the market discount factor. Imposing the transversality condition, limT!1 ￿
TEtP L
t+T =
0, setting, in order to be speci￿c, ￿ = 0:96, and assuming that ln(yt) follows the univariate
AR(2) process described above, we generate the implied moments for P L. Table 3 compares
these moments with those documented for house prices in U.S. cities in Table 2. As may
10be seen the relative volatility of the price of a claim to local income is less than a third
of that houses in the data. Moreover, despite the fact that income growth exhibits serial
correlation, this does not translate into any momentum in P L, at all. Indeed, for an income
process to generate momentum in the price of such an asset, extremely high and persistent
serial correlation in income growth would be required. The reason for this is, of course, that
movements in the price of these claims immediately capitalize future income ￿ uctuations.
Table 3: Prices of a claim to local income ￿income shock















3 The model environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t. We consider an economy characterized by a single housing
market (which we refer to as the city) and a largely unmodeled ￿rest of the world￿ .14 The
aggregate economy is populated by measure Qt of ex ante identical households, which grows
exogenously at net rate ￿. Each period, new households enter the city through a process
described below. All households living in the city require housing, and they each may either
own or rent a house to live in. On entry to the city, households are randomly and permanently
di⁄erentiated into two types, those who may derive utility from owning the house in which
they live and those that do not. All households discount the future at rate ￿ 2 (0;1).
Each household is in￿nitely-lived and is endowed with two types of labour: general labour
and construction labour. At each date t, a household supplies one unit of general labour
inelastically and lt units of construction labour endogenously, taking the construction wage
wt as given.15 General labour earns yt per unit supplied, where yt is city-speci￿c, exogenous
14The sole concern of agents residing in the rest of the world at the beginning of each period is whether
or not to enter the city.
15It is straightforward to further generalize preferences so that general labour is also supplied endogenously.
This, however, would make no di⁄erence to our analysis, provided that agents￿preferences are separable in
the disutility of supplying each type of labour.
11and follows a stationary stochastic process in log-levels. We parameterize speci￿c processes
for yt below in Section 6.
At date t, preferences over consumption ct; construction labour lt and housing zt are
given by:














and ￿ and ￿ are constants. The variable zt denotes a utility premium derived from owning
the house in which the household lives. In particular, zt = zH if the household likes the
house it owns, and zt = 0 either if the household does not like the house it owns or is
renting. We assume that zH represents a constant service ￿ ow and re￿ ects the owner￿ s
personal preference for his/her house. It is constant over time because any depreciation
resulting from occupancy is assumed to be o⁄set by maintenance. We let m denote the cost
of maintenance incurred by the owner.
In period t, the city has a stock Ht of housing units, which are either occupied by a
resident owner, rented to a resident, or vacant and o⁄ered for sale. The measure of resident
home-owners is denoted by Nt, and that of renters by Bt + Ft. Here Bt is the measure of
renters who would like to own a house (and so are currently searching for one to buy) and
Ft is that of renters that are not interested in owning.16 A measure St of houses are for
sale, where St = Ht ￿ Nt ￿ Bt ￿ Ft. Houses for sale include both newly built ones that
are currently owned by developers, and houses put up for sale by resident owners who either
do not want them anymore or are moving elsewhere. At the beginning of each period, a
house that is not currently owner-occupied can either be rented or listed for sale. Let HR
t
denote the stock of houses available for rent. A rented house earns rent rt less the constant
maintenance cost m. The rental market is competitive.
In the city, there are a large number of developers who behave competitively and operate
a technology for the construction of new housing units. Each new house requires one unit
of land, which can be purchased in a competitive market at unit price qt, and 1=￿ units of
construction labour. Houses constructed at time t become available either for sale or for rent
at time t + 1 and do not depreciate over time. The stock of houses thus evolves over time
16These permanent renters do not play a crucial role in our analysis. We allow for them in order to capture
the fact that not all renters are actively searching for a home to own.
12according to
Ht+1 ￿ Ht = ￿Lt; (5)
and the labor market clears so that
(Nt + Bt + Ft)lt = Lt: (6)
Newly built houses are identical to pre-existing ones. Developers can either rent them out
or designate them for sale, in which case they remain vacant for at least one period and have
exactly the same value as existing vacant houses. Only houses that are occupied require
maintenance to o⁄set depreciation.
We assume that land which is potentially available for residential use, ^ Ht, grows at an
exogenous rate equal to the growth rate of the population, ￿.17 To convert land to residential
use, however, a cost must be incurred. The cost of converting a particular parcel of land is
stochastic, and is represented by a draw c from a stationary distribution ￿(￿) with support
[0;￿ c]: Here we have in mind that costs vary depending on the speci￿c nature of the new
land (e.g. with topography, etc.). Only those parcels with c < qt will be converted in a
given period. It follows that the supply of actual residential land for housing, Ht, evolves
according to
￿Ht = ￿(qt)￿ ^ Ht: (7)





market price of land satis￿es







Here ￿ represents the elasticity of new land supply with respect to its price. In principle,
this elasticity depends on many factors including physical characteristics, land regulations
and local politics (see Saiz, 2010).
At the beginning of period t, measure ￿Qt￿1 of new households arrive in the economy.
Each of these households has a best alternative to entering the city, which we denote ": Here
" is distributed across the new households according to a stationary distribution function
17This assumption is necessary to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path. A similar assumption
is made by Davis and Heathcote (2005).
13G(") with support [0;￿ "].18 There exists a critical alternative value "c
t, at which a new
household is just indi⁄erent to entering the city:
"
c
t = ￿ Wt; (9)
where ￿ Wt is the value of being a new entrant to the city. All non-resident households with
" ￿ "c
t enter the city and are immediately separated into two types. A fraction   of the
new entrants derive utility from owning their own home per se and become potential buyers,
while the rest do not and become perpetual renters.19 Let Wt denote the value of being a
potential buyer and W
f
t the value of being a perpetual renter. It follows that
￿ Wt =  Wt + (1 ￿  )W
f
t : (10)
Searching for a house to own takes at least one period, and during this time potential buyers
also rent. At the end of each period, perpetual renters may, with probability ￿f 2 (0;1),
experience an exogenous shock that induces them to leave the city. On receiving this shock
they move out immediately and receive a continuation value Z. Otherwise they remain as
renters in the next period.
Home-owners are subject to two exogenous shocks. With probability ￿h 2 (0;1) owners
receive a shock that causes them to want to leave the city. Like renters, upon receiving
this shock they move out immediately and receive Z. They now also have a vacant house
which they either rent or hold vacant for sale. With probability ￿ 2 (0;1) the remaining
(1 ￿ ￿h)Nt of owners at date t will ￿nd that they no longer derive the utility premium zH
from owning their current house. Such ￿mismatched￿owners immediately move out of their
current house, put it up for sale, and rent while searching for a new one.20
We assume that capital markets are perfect and that the gross interest rate is 1=￿.
Because capital markets are complete and there is free entry into construction, households
do not have any interest in owning houses either as a means of saving or for speculative
purposes. As such, it makes no di⁄erence whether or not we allow for the trading of vacant
18Appendix D describes an interpretation of G(￿) based on a multi-city model in which agents realized
di⁄erent amenity values from residence in any of the many cities. The key assumption here is that income,
y, is truly city-speci￿c. That is, that ￿ uctuations in it a⁄ect only the attractiveness of our representative
city to potential entrants.
19We could also allow a fraction of renters to become buyers each period. Once calibrated appropriately,
it turns out that this makes little di⁄erence to our results.
20As we shall see later, in equilibrium mis-matched owners are indi⁄erent between moving out and remain-
ing in their own house while searching. Assuming some or all mis-matched owners remain in their current
home while searching yields almost identical results. In any case, a mis-matched owner who moves out has
a vacant house, which in each period may be either rented or held vacant for sale.
14houses in a Walrasian market. It is, however, important that in order to receive utility zH
from owning, households must search for the right house through a time-consuming process
that depends on the measures of buyers and vacant houses/sellers in the market.
The market for residential houses is characterized by random search. The measure of
matches is determined by the matching function M(Bt;St), which is increasing in both
arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale. It follows that a buyer will ￿nd a vacant





where !t = Bt=St is the tightness of the housing market, i.e. the ratio of searching buyers




= ￿ (!t) = !t ￿(!t): (12)
All buyers and sellers take the matching probabilities ￿ and ￿ as given, when they search in
the market. We impose the following assumption on the matching function:
Assumption 1. There exists an interval (!; ￿ !), with 0 < ! < ￿ ! < 1, such that for all
! 2 (!; ￿ !): (i) ￿(!) 2 [0;1], ￿ (!) 2 [0;1], lim
!!￿ ! ￿(!) = lim
!!! ￿ (!) ￿ 0 and lim
!!! ￿(!) =
lim
!!￿ !￿ (!) = 1; (ii) ￿
0(!) < 0, ￿0(!) > 0.
We associate the rate at which houses sell, ￿t, with their liquidity. When this rate
increases (decreases), houses become more (less) liquid, by which we mean they sell more
(less) quickly. We parameterize a speci￿c matching function as part of our calibration in
Section 5. Once matched, the price is determined according to a simple Nash bargaining
scheme in which ￿ denotes the share of the total match surplus received by the buyer.
Our model has much in common with standard search and matching models used, for
example, in the labour search literature. There are, however, several key di⁄erences which
play a crucial role in our characterization of housing market dynamics. Firstly, every
potential home buyer eventually becomes a seller. This implies that expected future market
conditions (which determine capital gains) play a role in determining a potential buyer￿ s
value of owning a home and hence the current transaction price. Secondly, new vacant
homes are produced at a unit cost which varies with supply and demand. It is through this
avenue that housing price adjustments ultimately occur. Finally, the rental market plays a
key role in absorbing new potential buyers into the city while allowing some substitution of
non-owned housing between the rental and the vacant-for-sale pools.
154 Equilibrium
Linearity of preferences in consumption, together with the perfect capital markets, implies
that households are indi⁄erent with regard to the timing of their consumption. The optimal




We denote the net bene￿t of supplying labour as






Perpetual renters never choose to search for a house and remain as renters until they











t = yt + x(wt) ￿ rt: (16)
The stock of perpetual renters evolves according to
Ft = (1 ￿ ￿f)Ft￿1 + (1 ￿  )G("
c
t)￿Qt￿1: (17)





Z + Et~ Vt+1
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿n)￿￿
￿
EtWt+1 + Et~ Vt+1
￿




t = yt + x(wt) + z
H ￿ m: (19)
At the beginning of each period, a house that is not currently occupied by the owner can be
either rented or listed for sale. Thus, the value of a house which is not owner￿ occupied is
given by
~ Vt = max
h
rt ￿ m + ￿Et~ Vt+1; Vt
i
; (20)
where Vt is the value of a house designated for sale.
16An agent with a vacant house is free to enter the market as a seller at no cost and matches
with a prospective buyer with probability ￿ (!t). Within a match, the house purchase price,
Pt, solves the Nash bargaining problem, so that:
Pt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (EtJt+1 ￿ EtWt+1) + ￿￿EtVt+1; (21)
where we interpret ￿ as the seller￿ s bargaining weight. In our analysis, we focus on situations
in which the total trade surplus in the housing market is strictly positive, i.e.
Et
h
Jt+1 ￿ Wt+1 ￿ ~ Vt+1
i
> 0: (22)
As we demonstrate below, condition (22) must hold in a steady￿ state equilibrium.
If a house held vacant for sale is not sold in the current period, the seller keeps it and
receives the value of a house that is not currently owner-occupied at the beginning of the
next period. It follows that the value of a vacant house for sale satis￿es
Vt = ￿ (!t)Pt + [1 ￿ ￿ (!t)]￿Et~ Vt+1: (23)
Given (23), a seller is willing to enter the market if Pt ￿ ￿Et~ Vt+1.
A buyer who is successfully matched pays the price Pt, and becomes a home-owner in
the next period, receiving value Jt+1. One who remains unmatched continues to search in
the next period. Buyers, who are by de￿nition searching for a house, are subject to neither
separation nor preference shocks. Recall that they are currently renting, and thus receive the
renter utility uR
t for the current period. The value of being a buyer Wt is therefore given by
Wt = u
R
t + ￿(!t(Pt))(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt) + [1 ￿ ￿(!t(Pt))]￿EtWt+1: (24)
It is clear that a buyer is willing to enter the market if and only if Pt ￿ ￿ (EtJt+1 ￿ EtWt+1).
Given, however, that there is an active market of houses for sale, the stock of buyers at
date t is given by:
Bt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿h)Nt￿1 +  G("
c
t)￿Qt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿(!t￿1))Bt￿1; (25)
and the stock of home-owners evolves via
Nt = (1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿)Nt￿1 + ￿(!t￿1)Bt￿1: (26)
Overall, at time t, the state, st, of the economy is given by level of income in the city, yt,
and the measures of buyers, Bt, home-owners, Nt, permanent renters, Ft, and houses, Ht.
The state evolves via (5), (17), (25), (26), and the stochastic process for local income, yt.
17De￿nition. A search equilibrium is a collection of functions of the state, st. The relevant
functions are the values of houses vacant for sale, Vt, home-ownership, Jt, new entrants, W t,
searchers, Wt, permanent renters, W
f
t , the entry value cuto⁄, "c
t, The price of houses, Pt,
rent, rt, wage, wt, the number of houses for rent, HR
t , the measures Bt, Nt, Ft, Ht, and
housing market tightness, !t. These functions satisfy:
i. New households enter the market optimally so that (9) and (25) are satis￿ed;
ii. The values of home-ownership, vacant houses, search (i.e. being a buyer), permanent
renters, and new entrants satisfy (10), (15), (18), (23) and (24), respectively.
iii. The owner of a vacant house is indi⁄erent between renting the unit and holding it vacant
for sale:
~ Vt = rt ￿ m + ￿Et~ Vt+1 = Vt; (27)
iv. The house price, Pt, satis￿es (21).
v. The market for rental housing clears:
H
R
t = Bt + Ft; (28)




+ qt; Ht+1 ￿ Ht; (29)
where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness;
vii. The construction wage, wt, clears the market for construction labour.
viii. The value of home-ownership, Jt, is bounded, ruling out bubbles: limT!1 ￿
TEtJt+T =
0.
4.1 The equilibrium dynamic system
In an equilibrium with an active housing market (i.e. in which (22) holds) the return
to renting a house for a period equals the expected gain from holding it vacant for sale.
Combining (23) and (27), we have:
rt ￿ m = ￿t (Pt ￿ ￿EtVt+1): (30)
18We focus on equilibria in which construction of houses is always positive, that is, Ht+1 > Ht.21
It then follows from (5), (27) and (29) that the quantity of new housing constructed in period
t is given by
Ht+1 ￿ Ht = ￿￿
1+￿ (Nt + Bt + Ft)(￿EtVt+1 ￿ qt)
￿ : (31)
To obtain a stationary representation of the economy, we normalize the state variables
(other than yt) by the total population Qt. We use lower case letters to represent per capita
values. Given (17), (25), (26) and (31), the laws of motion for renters, buyers, owners and
houses, per capita, respectively, can be written as
(1 + ￿)ft = (1 ￿  )￿G
￿ ￿ Wt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿f)ft￿1 (32)
(1 + ￿)bt =  ￿G
￿ ￿ Wt
￿
+ [1 ￿ ￿(!t￿1)]bt￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿n)nt￿1 (33)
(1 + ￿)nt = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)nt￿1 + ￿(!t￿1)bt￿1 (34)
(1 + ￿)ht+1 = ht + ￿￿
1+￿ (nt + bt + ft)(￿EtVt+1 ￿ qt)
￿ : (35)
By de￿nition, the tightness of the housing market is given by
!t =
bt
ht ￿ bt ￿ ft ￿ nt
: (36)
Moreover, market-clearing in the rental market implies
h
R
t = bt + ft: (37)
4.2 The deterministic steady-state
We now consider a steady-state in which non-construction income per capita is constant and
normalized to unity: yt = 1. In this setting all normalized quantities and values are constant
and their steady-state values are indicated with an asterix. The steady-state conditions are
laid out in full in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. In the steady-state, the surplus from a match in the owned housing market must













21It is straightforward to show that this will be the case in any search equilibrium for an economy with
su¢ cient population growth.
19Intuitively, the fact that this surplus is always positive follows from the fact that matched
buyers strictly prefer owning to renting and there is no cost to selling. As a result, housing
transactions always take place as long as the matching rate is positive.
Using the steady-state conditions, it is straightforward to derive a relationship between
market tightness and the value of a house for sale required to induce developers to produce:
Lemma 2. In the steady-state, there exists a negative ￿supply-side￿ relationship between
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￿+￿n+￿(1￿￿n) ; B = ￿ +  ￿f and ￿ q = ￿ cF ￿1(h￿=^ h).
The relationship described in (39) can be interpreted as follows. As the value of vacant
housing rises, new construction is stimulated and more houses become available for sale.
This drives down the market tightness !, i.e. the ratio of buyers to houses for sale. Note
that (39) implies that houses will always be built in steady state so long as ￿ > 0 since this
ensures that ￿V > ￿ q.
The steady-state conditions also yield another relationship between the value of houses
for sale to buyers and market tightness:
Lemma 3. In a steady-state, there exists a positive ￿demand￿ side￿relationship between the





￿ (!￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿zH
(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)] + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿n￿)￿￿(!￿)￿
: (40)
Intuitively, a higher ratio of buyers to sellers, i.e. a tighter market, has two e⁄ects. Firstly,
it increases the rate at which houses sell, ￿. For a given selling price, this drives up the
value of a vacant house. Secondly, it lowers the rate at which buyers ￿nd houses, which
increases the gain from becoming an owner. This raises the transaction price of houses, and
so the value of a house for sale.
Combining lemmas 2 and 3 yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let parameters be such that V D(!) < V S(!) and V D(￿ !) < V S(￿ !). Then,
there exists a unique interior steady-state equilibrium in which !￿ 2 (!; ￿ !).
20Figure 2: Steady State Equilibrium
Figure 2 depicts the existence of a steady-state equilibrium (SSE) at the intersection of (39)
and (40) such that !￿ 2 [!; ￿ !]. This SSE is interior in the sense that the probabilities of
buying and selling are strictly less than unity. If the point of intersection were to occur at
!￿ < !, the economy would be driven to a corner SSE in which the probability of buying
is given by ￿ = 1. Conversely, if the point of intersection were to occur at !￿ > ￿ !, the
economy would be driven to a corner SSE in which the probability of selling is given by
￿ = 1. The conditions under which an interior SSE exists are parametric, with the values
of ! and ￿ ! depending on the speci￿c matching function (see Appendix B, equations (79)
and (80)). In our baseline calibration below, and in all of the experiments and robustness
checks that we consider, the steady-state is always interior. Although it is straightforward,
we therefore omit a full analysis of corner SSE for the sake of brevity.22
5 Calibration
In order to study the dynamics of the model, we linearize the dynamic system for a calibrated
version of the economy in a neighborhood of its unique deterministic steady-state. In all
cases that we consider, the resulting systems of ￿rst-order linear di⁄erence equations satisfy
the conditions for saddle-path stability. We solve numerically for the implied local dynamics
22For some matching functions (e.g. urn-ball) the SSE is always interior.
21driven by stochastic movements in yt using a ￿rst-order perturbation method.23
5.1 Baseline parameterization







where ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1).
Table 4 gives the parameter values for the baseline. Numbers above the line are set
to match the indicated targets directly. Values below the line are set jointly so that the
speci￿ed steady-state values generated by the model match the given targets. For illustrative
purposes, however, in the table we associate these parameters with a speci￿c target for which
it is particularly relevant.
We de￿ne a period to equal one quarter. We set ￿ to re￿ ect an annual interest rate of
4% and ￿ is chosen to match annual population growth during the 1990s.24 We normalize
￿ y = 1. Thus, present values and prices are all measured relative to the steady-state per
capita income.
We set ￿f to match the annual fraction of renters that move between counties, which
is about 12% on average according to the Census Bureau. Similarly, ￿n is set to match
the annual fraction of home-owners that move between counties (3.2%) and ￿ is set so to
match the fraction of owners that, conditionally on moving, do not change counties (60%).
Dieleman, Clark and Deurloo (2000) estimate an overall housing turnover rate of 8% annually
(see also Caplin and Leahy, 2008), which is consistent with our quarterly value of ￿n + (1 ￿
￿n)￿ ’ 0:02. We set Z = ￿ uR=(1￿￿) so that the value of exiting is equal to the steady-state
value of being perpetual renter.
The parameter ￿ represents the labor productivity of the construction sector. The ra-
tio of permits issued in the U.S. each quarter to the numbers of employees in residential
construction is approximately 0.1 on average. If the average working week is 35 hours (or
roughly 400 hours per quarter), then the number of permits produced per hour worked equals
approximately 0.00025 (this amounts to 4,000 man-hours per house).
A related parameter is the price elasticity of land supply, ￿. Saiz (2010) studies the
relationship between house prices and the stock of housing based on a long di⁄erence esti-
23We have also solved it using a second-order perturbation method in Dynare. The results are identical.
24Population growth has slowed somewhat in recent years.
22mation between 1970 and 2000 for 95 U.S. cities.25 In particular, by instrumenting using
new measures of regulatory restrictions and geographical constraints, he is able to infer city
level price elasticities that vary due to natural and man-made land constraints. His supply
elasticity estimates vary from 0.60 to 5.45 with a population￿ weighted average of 1.75 (2.5
unweighted). We therefore set ￿ = 1:75 in our baseline. In any case, below we consider the
sensitivity of our results to variations in this parameter.
The steady-state unit price of land ￿ q is set so that the relative share of land in the price
of housing is 30% (see Davis and Palumbo, 2008, and Saiz, 2010). The average price of a
house is approximately 3.2 times annual income or 12.8 times quarterly income. This implies
a ratio of the land price to income of 0:3 ￿ 12:8 = 3:84.
Table 4: Baseline Calibration Parameters: Steady State
Parameter Value Target
￿ 0.99 Annual real interest rate = 4%
￿ 0.003 Annual population growth rate = 1.2%
￿f 0.030 Annual mobility of renters = 12%
￿n 0.008 Annual mobility of owners = 3.2%
￿ 0.012 Fraction of moving owners that stay local = 60%
￿ 2:5 ￿ 10￿4 Quarterly permits/construction employment (hours)
￿ 1.75 Median price-elasticity of land supply = 1.75
q 3.84 Average land price-income ratio
  0.43 Fraction of households that rent = 32%
m 0.0125 Average rent to average income ratio, r￿ = 0.137
zH 0.028 Zero net-of-maintenance depreciation
￿ 0.76 Vacancy rate = 2%
￿ 0.0916 Months to sell = months to buy
￿ 0.038 P ￿ = 12:8
We choose the remaining parameters so that several key steady-state statistics match
their average counterparts in U.S. data. In particular, the value of   is calibrated so that
the average fraction of households that rent in the steady-state (b + f)=(n + b + f) is 32%.
The maintenance cost m is chosen so that the rent is 13.7% of median income. Note that
the income of the average renter in the U.S. is less than half of that of the average owner,
re￿ ecting the fact that the characteristics of owners and renters di⁄er systematically. On
average, a renter in the U.S. allocates 24% of his after-tax income to rent (see Davis and
25In this sense, the estimated relationship picks up long term dynamics associated with ￿. In contrast, the
estimates of Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (2005) relate to short run dynamics associated with ￿.
23Ortalo-Magne, 2011). Since in our model all agents are homogeneous, we target the ratio of
rent to the median income of owners and renters, which is somewhat lower (see Head and
Lloyd-Ellis, 2012 for details).
As described earlier, we assumed that the maintenance cost is just enough to o⁄set de-
preciation. Let d denote the rate of depreciation. Then, under a simple optimal maintenance










Harding et al. (2007, p. 212) estimate the gross maintenance rate of depreciation for a house
of median age in the U.S. to be about 3% annually.27 It follows from (42) that zh = 0:028.
Again, we consider below the sensitivity of our results to alternative values.
We assume that, in steady-state, the time taken to sell a house is equal to the time taken
to buy, so that !￿ = 1. This is approximately true in the long run according to surveys
conducted by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). Given the other parameters of
the model, it follows that the matching function parameter, ￿, determines the steady-state
value of the vacancy rate. Average vacancy rates for the U.S. economy and by MSA are
available from the Census Bureau￿ s Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS). In our model, houses
that are vacant in equilibrium are designated for sale. The HVS distinguishes the category
￿vacant units which are for sale only￿ . In 2000, for example, this category constituted 1%
of the overall housing stock. Since owned homes constituted approximately two-thirds of
the housing stock, this corresponds to a home-owner vacancy rate of about 1.5%.28 Housing
units that are in the category ￿vacant units for rent￿actually consist, however, of vacant
units o⁄ered for rent only and those o⁄ered both for rent and sale. In 2000, for example,
houses both for rent and sale constituted a further 2.6% of the overall housing stock.29 In our
model, vacant units are technically available for rent in the subsequent period, so it makes
26Suppose zH
t = zH(Qt)where Qt denotes the quality of a house. The optimal maintenance program of a
home￿ owner can be expressed as
V (Qt) = max
fmt;Qtg
zH(Qt) ￿ mt + ￿V (Qt+1)
s.t. Qt+1 = (1 ￿ d)Qt + mt:
If zH(Qt) is approximately linear, then the steady-state solution to this program implies (42).
27The resulting actual depreciation rate is rather less than 1% precisely because maintenance is undertaken.
28This number is close to the average over the period 1980-2008. However, more recently homeowner
vacancy rates have exceeded 2.5%.
29Again, since rental units constitute about a third of the housing stock, this corresponds to a rental
vacancy rate of about 8%.
24sense to include some of those vacant units o⁄ered for both rent and sale in our measure of
vacancies. For this reason, we assume an additional 1% of the housing stock is vacant and
for sale, so that v = 0:02. Again, we consider the sensitivity of our results to alternative
values of v.
Given the values of ￿, ￿ and ￿n from Table 4 and our targets for   and v, the implied
steady-state probability of sale each period is ￿￿ = 0:76, leading to an average time for a
house to be on the market of just under 4 months. This may seem somewhat high given that
according to the NAR, the time taken to sell a typical house is about 2 months.30
Given the other parameters, ￿ is chosen so that the price of a house is 3.2 times annual
income or 12.8 times quarterly income. Note that the value of ￿ required to hit the targets
implies that just over 90% of the surplus from housing transactions goes to the seller.
5.2 The earnings process
Parameterization of the process for local non-construction earnings, yt, is complicated by
mismatch between the frequency of available city-level income data and the period length
assumed in our calibrated model. The income data is available annually, whereas the
baseline calibration assumes that each period is a quarter. While the period length could be
increased to one year in the model, this would be restrictive as it would require that houses
for sale remain vacant for at least one year, which is clearly counter-factual.
Instead, we derive a quarterly process for income that shares key properties at annual
frequencies with the process estimated in our panel VAR in Section 2. Speci￿cally, we
assume that the quarterly income process is given by
lnyt = alnyt￿1 + blnyt￿4 + "t, "t ￿ N(0;￿"): (43)
We set the parameters a = 1:05, b = ￿0:0375 and ￿" = 0:011, so that the implied annual
income process matches the volatility of income growth, ￿y, the ￿rst-order autocorrelation
coe¢ cient, ￿1, and the sum of the second-, third- and fourth-order autocorrelation coe¢ cients
(￿2 + ￿3 + ￿4) in the data. In Table 5 we report these moments for both the estimated and
constructed processes.31
30There are varying estimates of the time to buy and the time to sell. Diaz and Jerez (2012) use 2 months
based on a report from the National Association of Realtors. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) suggest using 6
months. Anglin and Arnott (1999) report estimates of up to 4 months. The NARs estimate of ￿time on the
market￿is somewhat misleading because houses are sometimes strategically de-listed and quickly re-listed
in order to reset the ￿days on market￿￿eld in the MLS listing (see Levitt and Syverson, 2008).
31The translation from an annual to a quarterly process is discussed more formally in Appendix C.
25Table 5: Implied moments for annual income growth process
￿y ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4
Data 0.02 0.26 0.02 -0.05 -0.07
Arti￿cial 0.02 0.26 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Using the constructed process for earnings and the linearized model, we generate sample
paths for the key variables of the model and use these to construct ￿annual￿time series for
the economy.32
5.3 Three elasticities
The dynamics of the model depend crucially on three elasticities:
￿ The elasticity of the distribution of alternative values, G(￿), in the vicinity of steady-state





and determines the responsiveness of the entry of potential buyers to changes in the value of
search.33 In the steady state, all that depends on G(￿) is the measure of searching households
per capita, b￿. This is not something that is directly observed, and so the parameters
determining the relevant characteristics of G(￿) cannot be identi￿ed in this way.
￿ The elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of buyers, ￿. Since
!￿ = 1, the elasticity of the matching function does not a⁄ect the steady-state. Out of the
steady-state, however, it determines in part the relationship between sales and prices.
￿ The wage elasticity of construction labor supply, ￿. This determines the responsiveness
of construction to the value of housing. In a model with no frictions, this elasticity equals
that of new housing construction to the sales price. Recent estimates of this using annual
data range from about 1.6 to 5 at the national level (see Topel and Rosen (1988), Poterba
(1991) and Blackley (1999)). For a sample of 45 cities, Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (2005)
estimate a median elasticity of about 5. In our model with search frictions, however, the
value of a newly constructed house does not correspond directly to the transactions price,
but also depends on the endogenous absorption rate.
Our approach is to use our estimates of the relative standard deviations of population
growth, construction and sales growth in response to income shocks from Table 2 to jointly
32We have also experimented with an ARMA(1,4) process where the shock￿ s direct e⁄ect on income is
divided over four quarters. This has no impact on our results.
33Since we log-linearize the model around the steady state, it is not necessary to specify the entire function
G(￿).
26calibrate the values of ￿, ￿ and ￿. Speci￿cally, we choose these parameters so that, given
the earnings process, the stochastic output from our model generates the relative standard
deviations, ￿n=￿y, ￿h=￿y and ￿s=￿y, which exactly match those in the data.34
Several observations should be made here. Firstly, it is not necessarily possible a priori
to match all three moments exactly. In a model with no frictions, for example, ￿n = ￿h
by construction and there is no parameter ￿. Secondly, the calibration of these parameters
depends crucially on the pricing protocol in the housing market. For this reason any calibra-
tion or estimation must be speci￿c to the model being assumed. We cannot use independent
estimates from the literature which are inferred using models with no frictions. Finally,
pinning down the elasticities in this way does not, by itself, neither imposes any particular
process for house prices, nor does it determine the autocorrelation or comovement of these
variables. Once again, however, we consider the sensitivity of our results to variations in
the calibrated parameters in Section 6.
Table 6: Baseline Calibration Parameters: Non Steady-State
Parameter Value Target
￿ 7.00 Relative volatility of population growth = 0.17
￿ 0.67 Relative volatility of sales growth = 1.32
￿ 1.60 Relative volatility of construction rate = 0.11
5.4 An economy with no search
A version of the economy with no search is described in Appendix B. We think of this
economy as comparable in many ways to that studied by Glaeser et. al. (2010), although
there are some important di⁄erences and these are discussed in the appendix. In this
economy, houses are e⁄ectively identical. That is, an agent who is not a permanent renter
realizes the utility gain from home-ownership, zH, from living in any house. This eliminates
the need for time-consuming matching between buyers and sellers.
The parameters of this economy are set as in Table 4 except for  , m, zH and ￿, These
are adjusted so that the steady-state again matches the relevant targets.35 Without search,















34When computing sales of existing houses in our model, we assume that new and existing houses which
are not owner occupied are equally likely to be rented each period.
35Obviously, the parameters of the matching function ￿ and ￿ are not relevant in this case.
27We use (45) to derive the value of ￿ such that P ￿ = 12:8. In the model with no search the
stock of housing must equal the number of households. It follows (as noted above) that it is
not possible to match the di⁄erent volatilities of population growth and construction. In this
case, we ￿xed ￿ and set ￿ = 2:1, so that the implied relative volatility of the construction
rate, ￿h=￿y, matched that in the data.36
5.5 Steady-state implications
Although we are primarily concerned with the model￿ s dynamics, here we brie￿ y consider the
steady-state implications of search frictions for market tightness, house prices and welfare.
In particular, we ask what happens as we vary the ￿productivity￿of the matching function,
which in the Cobb-Douglas case is given by ￿. The measure of welfare that we use is the
steady-state value of entering the city, ￿ W ￿. This measure gives equal weight to the welfare
of prospective owners and renters and takes into account the likelihood of buying, selling and
exiting the city in the future.37 Figure 3 illustrates how house prices and welfare, repectively,
vary with market tightness as we change ￿ between 0 and 1.
Figure 3: Varying the productivity of matching in steady state
36Alternatively, we could have ￿xed ￿ and calibrated ￿. We tried this, and produced similar results.
37As such it is akin to the expected utility of a newborn in an overlapping generations model. For this
reason, the measure re￿ ects the utility of current buyers rather than current sellers.
28As ￿ is increased, the rate at which houses sell for a given buyer-seller ratio, ￿(￿), increases
as well. This causes the value of unoccupied homes to their owners to increase and the unit
value required by developers to decrease. These two factors induce market tightness to
decline in the steady state (Figure 2), as the supply of new housing increases faster than
the demand. The impact on the value of vacant houses and hence on transaction prices is,
in general, ambiguous and depends on the relative elasticities of entry and housing supply.
In our calibration, steady-state housing prices rise with market tightness. It should not,
therefore, be surprising that as ￿ is increased, the welfare of new entrants rises; it becomes
easier to ￿nd a house and prices fall.
6 Equilibrium Dynamics
6.1 Qualitative implications of a shock to local income
We ￿rst describe the qualitative implications of the model. We note at the outset that the
model￿ s dynamics are not driven by the hump-shaped dynamics of income observed in the
data. That is, a su¢ ciently persistent AR(1) process for income generates impulse response
functions that are essentially identical to those reported here.
The implied impulse response functions (IRF￿ s) following a shock to local income are
depicted in Figures 4 and 5.38 The ￿ve panels of Figure 4 depict the IRFs for income,
house prices, sales growth (of existing houses), construction rates, and population growth
relative to trend for the economies with and without search. In both economies, the shock to
income induces entry and population growth rises. Although the responses of city population
growth in the two cases are qualitatively similar, entry is initially much more rapid in the
search economy. The responses of house prices, growth in sales of existing houses and the
construction rate, however, di⁄er qualitatively across the two economies. The search model
generates momentum in both prices and construction which is qualitatively similar to the
dynamics of the empirical model illustrated in Figure 1. Moreover, as in the empirical
characterization, sales growth spikes quickly and then declines sharply before rising again in
the long run. In contrast, the economy with no search generates no momentum in either
prices or construction rates, despite generating substantial momentum in the housing stock,
and sales growth rises and then returns monotonically to trend.
The force which generates serial correlation in both house price appreciation and the
38Although the model time period is a quarter, we have provided annualized versions of the IRFs to allow

















































































































































































































































Figure 4: Impulse responses with and without search (1)
construction rate and the movements in sales growth in the search economy is the illiquidity of
housing. To see this, consider Figure 5, which depicts in its ￿ve panels vacancies and market
tightness, !, for the search economy, and rent, rt, construction wages and construction
employment for both economies.
Initially, an increase in the value of living in the city (due here to the income shock) gen-
erates an immediate increase in search activity as households enter and some begin searching
for a house. Ignoring, for now, any response of the measure of vacant houses for sale, the
ratio of buyers to sellers (i.e. tightness) increases, reducing the rate at which buyers ￿nd
homes through the matching process. Although the growth in sales of existing homes jumps
initially, the increase in tightness causes it to slow again almost immediately. The price of
30a house re￿ ects in part its future resale value (as home-owners expect to sell the house even-
tually, when they leave the city). Thus, an increase in tightness, by raising the per-period
probability of sale, increases both the value of a vacant house, and the transaction price.
Because newly-entering buyers are not all immediately matched with sellers, and because
entry is persistent (owing to the persistence of the income shock), unmatched buyers ￿build
up￿in the market over time, generating future increases in both tightness and the rate at
which houses sell in the search economy (see the two upper panels of Figure 5). As houses
become more liquid over time and sell more quickly, their value increases and transaction
prices increase further as well, resulting in persistent house price appreciation in response to
the income shock.
Both the overall supply of housing and the allocation of houses between the rental market
and vacancies for sale, respond to the income shock in ways a⁄ected by movements in hous-
ing liquidity. New entrants to the city require housing immediately. This causes the shifting
of vacant houses into the rental market because the overall stock of housing units cannot
respond instantaneously. Even if the equilibrium rent does not initially rise, or rises only
slightly, owners of vacant houses are compensated for the temporary renting of their hous-
ing units by the return on houses associated with both expected future increases in house
sale prices and lower future time on the market. An increased relative supply of rental
housing keeps the rental rate from rising too rapidly and reinforces the continued entry of
buyers which drives the subsequent price appreciation. This e⁄ect supports the underlying
momentum in house prices. The increased value of a vacant house induces developers to
build houses and leads to an increase in the housing stock. Moreover, momentum in the
construction rate is generated through the same mechanism as momentum in the housing
price; persistent growth of market tightness and thus reductions in the time required for a
resident owner to sell a house.
Eventually, as per capita income reverts to its steady-state level, entry slows and the
population growth rate returns to its trend. Increased construction lowers market tightness
and causes both the value of a vacant house and the transaction price to return to their
steady-state values. As may be seen, one failure of the model is that it generates too much
persistence in the deviation of all the variables from their steady state paths when compared
to the data. Once we approach ten years out, however, the con￿dence intervals associated
with the empirical IRFs become quite large.
Momentum in both the construction rate and the house price is thus generated by move-
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions with and without search (2)
the income shock. The economy with no search exhibits no such liquidity e⁄ect and thus
has very di⁄erent dynamics. There, increased entry simply leads to a higher house price
and increases in both the construction rate and house sales. All of these variables track the
population growth rate and thus exhibit no momentum. In addition, rent (which here is
paid only by those agents who do not derive utility from owning) behaves very di⁄erently in
the two economies. Because in the no-search economy there are no vacant houses that can
be shifted into the rental market, new entrants who do not want to buy houses bid up the
rent immediately as this is necessary to induce developers to produce new rental housing.
In contrast, for our baseline model with search, the rent actually falls initially because the
anticipated growth in prices temporarily induces houses that were previously vacant-for-sale
32to be supplied to the rental market. Eventually, however, as permanent renters move in,
growing demand counteracts this e⁄ect causing rents to rise.
6.2 Quantitative implications
As described above, using the constructed process for income and the linearized model, we
generate sample paths for the key variables of the model and use these to construct annualized
time series for the economy.39 Moments form these series, along with the corresponding
moments for the U.S. economy, are presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
Table 7.1: Volatilities and co-movements (models and 106 cities, 1981-2008)
Moment US Cities Baseline No search
￿p=￿y 1.60 1.45 2.10
￿s=￿y 1.32 1.32* 0.70
￿h=￿y 0.11 0.11* 0.11*
￿n=￿y 0.17 0.17* 0.11
￿py 0.76 0.98 0.98
￿sy 0.56 0.11 0.28
￿hy 0.54 0.26 0.36
￿ny 0.76 0.50 0.36
￿sp 0.02 0.07 0.28
Note: Values marked with a * are calibrated targets
First consider the moments in Table 7.1, which contains both the standard deviations
of house price appreciation, housing stock growth, and population growth relative to that
of local per capita income growth, and the correlations of those variables with local income
growth. In the table, the ￿rst column reports the numbers from our empirical analysis
in Section 2. The second column reports the results for our search model with the baseline
calibration, and the third column results for the economy with no search. Table 7.2 contains
the ￿rst four autocorrelation coe¢ cients for price appreciation, sales growth, housing growth
and population growth for the data and in the model.
The calibrated search model generates price volatility relative to income that is more than
80% of what is observed in the data. In contrast, the volatility generated by the model with
39Along a small fraction of sample paths, the buyer￿ s matching probability, ￿, exceeded unity for several
periods. To address this we ran the simulation both with no constraints and with the constraint that ￿ ￿ 1:
This made no di⁄erence to our results.
33no search is much higher. The search model is also able to account for a considerable amount
of serial correlation in price appreciation, almost half, and most of that in sales growth. The
model with search also does relatively well in terms of the rankings of volatility, correlation
with income growth and serial correlation for the four variables. That is, it is consistent
with the observation that price appreciation is the most volatile and most correlated with
income growth, followed by population growth and then by construction rates and sales
growth, whereas for persistence they are ranked in the opposite order.40 The search model
does, however, substantially understate the correlations of sale growth, construction and
population growth with income growth and overstate the persistence of both population
growth and construction. Finally, in contrast to the model with no search, the search
economy correctly predicts the very low correlation of price appreciation and sales growth
generated by city-speci￿c income shocks.
Table 7.2: Autocorrelations (106 cities, 1981-2008)














US Cities 0.75 0.37 0.05 -0.15 0.59 0.39 0.35 0.35
Baseline 0.34 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.52 0.18 0.04 -0.03










US Cities 0.67 0.40 0.19 0.09 0.88 0.61 0.33 0.11
Baseline 0.84 0.66 0.54 0.45 0.96 0.90 0.84 0.77
In summary, it is clear that the baseline calibration understates somewhat both the
relative volatility of house prices and its serial correlation observed in the data. Search,
however, seems to be necessary to generate any price momentum at all. Moreover, the model
with no search generates too much volatility in price appreciation and too little volatility in
sales growth.
6.3 Additional quantitative implications
Our estimated VAR was limited to certain key variables largely because of the availability of
data for as large a number of MSA￿ s as possible for a reasonably long time span. Our model,
40For the model with no search, population growth and the construction rate are equal, since there are no
vacancies.
34however, also makes predictions for several other variables on which we have more limited
data. Here we compare the predictions of the model for city-level wages and employment
in the construction sector and for rents with their counterparts in the data. In each case
data availability requires that we reduce the sample of cities and/or time periods relative
to that on which we estimated the VAR. It turns out, however, that the inclusion of these
other measures in VAR￿ s estimated over more limited samples has little or no e⁄ect on the
estimated properties of income, house prices, sales growth, construction, and population
growth.
6.3.1 Construction Wages and Employment
Construction labour data is not available on a consistent basis for all the cities in our sample.
We therefore drop the 10% of cities for which there are missing values and re-estimate the
panel VAR with the inclusion of construction wages and employment. As the implications
for co-movements among the other ￿ve variables remain largely unchanged, we focus here
only on the construction variables. The upper two panels of Figure 6 depicts the impulse
response function resulting from a shock to income, with the associated con￿dence intervals.41
Interestingly and in accordance with the theory, construction wages follow a very similar
pattern to house prices in Figure 1 while the IRF for construction labour looks very much
like that for the construction rate.
Table 8: Construction wages and employment (98 cities, 1981-2008)
Construction Wage Construction Employment









US Cities 0.58 0.96 0.41 0.04 -0.19 -0.23 1.41 0.79 0.60 0.18 -0.15 -0.34
Baseline 1.63 0.97 0.33 0.06 0.01 -0.02 2.61 0.97 0.33 0.06 0.01 -0.02
Table 8 documents key moments for growth in the construction wage and employment
in the data and the model. As before, the moments from the model are based on annual
statistics generated by a quarterly simulation that uses a linearized version of the model.
Clearly, the model overstates the volatility of both wages and employment. However, both
in the data and the model, the volatility of employment exceeds the volatility of wages. This
is consistent with the fact that the labour supply elasticity exceeds unity. The correlations



















































































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period (year)
Rent
Figure 6: Empirical impulse response functions
of wages and employment with income and their autocorrelations are equal to each other in
the model, by construction. The model understates the persistence in both variables, but
captures their high correlation with income.
6.3.2 Rents
Panel data for MSA averages of (quality-controlled) rents over a reasonable time period
appear to be unavailable. There is, however, data on ￿fair market rents￿by MSA which is
available on an annual basis going back to 1985 for the 106 cities in our sample. Here we
use the adjusted data constructed by van Nieuwerbugh and Weill (2010) (see Appendix A).
We re-estimate the panel VAR over the shorter time period with the inclusion of rents. One
36issue that must be dealt with is the fact that rents are commonly set for a year and may
be di¢ cult to adjust immediately in response to shocks. If we were to order rents before
income in the VAR, however, this would e⁄ectively ￿force￿there to be no initial response in
rents to the income shock. Instead, we include rents at time t+1 ordered after income in the
panel VAR and document the implications. Once again the results for the other variables
are robust to these changes, so we focus on the implications for the rent variable.
The lower panel of Figure 6 illustrates the impulse response for rent together with the
implied con￿dence interval. As predicted by the model, rents initially decline following
the shock and then subsequently rise. The initial decline in rents in the data is, however,
much smaller than that predicted by the model and is not statistically signi￿cant. Rents
subsequently rise quite slowly for 4 years after the shock before mean-reverting, but again
the con￿dence interval is very wide and includes zero.
In contrast to the construction labour market variables, the quantitative predictions of
the model for rent do not match the data well. Although the persistence documented in
Table 9 is similar, both the volatility of rent growth and its correlation with income growth
are an order of magnitude lower in the data then is predicted by the model. Of course, the
correspondence is even worse for the model with no search: volatility is much higher and the
correlation with income is perfect. Moreover, the persistence is much lower.
Table 9: Growth in Fair Market Rents (106 cities, 1985-2008)





US Cities 0.09 0.01 0.75 0.28 -0.15 -0.39
Baseline 5.50 0.79 0.68 0.35 0.17 0.06
It is hard to know what to make of the comparison of rents between the model and the
data. The fair market rent data may not provide an accurate measure of actual rents in
a given city. Moreover, the model assumes that all rents are re-set every quarter, whereas
actual rents are almost certainly adjusted less frequently. In many cases rents are adjusted
only annually, say when a new lease is signed, or when a new tenant moves in. In this sense
the average rent measured in the data may move much more sluggishly than the marginal
rent paid by a new tenant, and this is what is picked up as rent in the model.
Note that the insensitivity of rents to city-level income movements in the short run is
consistent with the empirical results of Saiz (2007). Based on an instrumental variables
approach, he ￿nds that MSA level incomes have no signi￿cant impact on rents, whereas
37their impact on house prices is much larger and signi￿cant. In the longer run he ￿nds
a stronger relationship between rents and incomes suggesting that rents adjust only very
sluggishly in response to income shocks.
6.3.3 Demographic shocks
It is straightforward to derive the implications of direct shocks to the population of cities (i.e.
movements that are not driven by income) from a our panel VAR. The interpretation of such
a shock, however, depends on exactly how it is modeled. For example, we could think of
shocks to the G(￿) function as driving entry. Alternatively, we could think of an unobserved
shock to the utility associated with a particular city that induces entry endogenously (e.g.
amenities). For the sake of brevity, it is useful to observe that the impulse response functions
associated with "population shocks" coming from our panel VAR are qualitatively similar
to those generated by income shocks. Therefore if we were to introduce an additive utility
shocks process in to the model with features similar to the current income shocks process, we
could generate reasonably similar IRFs. Of course such an exercise would be undisciplined
since the utility shock process is unobserved. This is why we have focussed on the role of
income shocks, the properties of which can be directly estimated.
6.4 Alternative calibrations
We now depart from the baseline calibration of Section 5 and consider the sensitivity of our
results to changes in the values of several parameters. Table 8 reports the implications of
alternative choices of the speci￿ed parameters for the relative volatility and the ￿rst-order
autocorrelation of price appreciation . In each case the targets listed in Table 4 remain ￿xed.
Thus, other parameters (i.e.  ; m, zh, ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿) are adjusted in each case to match the
targets. Each case in Table 10 therefore represents an alternative calibration of the model.
Perhaps not surprisingly, increasing either the elasticity of new construction supply or the
elasticity of land supply results in a decrease in price volatility and an increase in momentum.
We have chosen the alternative values of these parameters to be at the extremes of the range
of typical estimates. As may be seen within this range, these moments are much more
sensitive to new construction supply elasticity than land supply elasticity.42 Indeed for low
42This is true even though the range of labour supply elasticities considered is proportionately larger than
that of land supply elasticities.
38values of ￿ we obtain price volatilities that equal or exceed those observed in the data. This,
however, comes at the expense of a reduction in momentum, although it remains positive.
The trade-o⁄between volatility and momentum may be seen for all the parameter changes
considered in Table 10. Directly increasing the elasticity of entry, for example, implies a
greater responsiveness of new entrants to current market conditions in the city and corre-
spondingly less of a lag in entry. Consequently, prices become increasingly volatile and price
momentum declines. Of course, when we adjust this parameter we no longer match the
relative volatility of population growth.
Table 10: Volatility and Persistence of Price Appreciation: Sensitivity Results
Moment Baseline New housing Entry (demand) Matching
Calibration supply elasticity elasticity Elasticity
￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 10 ￿ = 3 ￿ = 20 ￿ = :5 ￿ = :9
￿p=￿y 1.45 2.92 0.83 0.48 2.63 1.59 1.28
￿
p
1 0.34 0.27 0.44 0.76 0.24 0.32 0.38
Land supply Vacancy Homeowner exit Housing
Moment elasticity Rate probability Utility
￿ = :5 ￿ = 5 v = :01 v = :03 ￿n = :004 ￿n = :012 zH = :01 zH = :04
￿p=￿y 1.83 1.30 1.75 1.22 1.46 1.39 0.89 1.56
￿
p
1 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.40 0.66 0.31
Targeting a higher steady-state vacancy rate of 3% implies a less e⁄ective matching
process in the housing market, ￿. As a result, it takes longer for households to ￿nd houses
and market tightness grows to a higher level as buyers exit the pool of searchers more slowly.
This tends to generate more momentum and less volatility in prices. When homeowners are
more likely to exit the city (i.e. when ￿n increases), they put more weight on future market
conditions. If these conditions are expected to improve due to gradual entry, the persistence
of current price growth increases in anticipation.
When we divorce housing utility, zH, from the cost of maintenance, so that (42) no
longer holds, we ￿nd that decreasing zH raises price momentum and lowers volatility. The
reason is that, in order to maintain the targets for the steady-state house price and vacancy
rate, the decrease in zH necessitates a reduction in the buyers￿share of the surplus in house
transactions. As a consequence, the house price becomes increasingly sensitive to future
market conditions and the slow increase in the likelihood of sale translates into more gradual
price growth.
397 Robustness
We now consider three alternative environments to assess further the robustness of our
￿ndings. Qualitatively, none of these a⁄ect our results signi￿cantly and in this sense we
￿nd our results to be very robust. Quantitatively, we ￿nd that our ￿ndings with respect
to both volatility and the co-movements among the variables that we have considered are
very robust. With regard to the degree of price momentum, however, our results are to some
extent sensitive to ￿ uctuations in the share of the surplus accruing to buyers and sellers in
housing transactions.
7.1 Mismatched owners remain in their houses
In our basic model, we assumed that mismatched owners put their houses up for sale imme-
diately and become renters. This is, however, a stark choice in the following sense:
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, mismatched owners are indi⁄erent between the following two
arrangements:
(1) putting up their house for sale or rent immediately and renting while searching;
(2) remaining in their current house while searching, then putting their vacant house up
for sale once they are matched with a new one.
Suppose instead that they remain in their houses until they ￿nd a new house, then put
their vacant house up for sale. Since owners who become mismatched are indi⁄erent between
the two alternatives, their values remain unchanged. 43 Let ~ nt denote mismatched owners
who remain in their (owned) homes. Then the ￿ ows of households between states is now
described by (32) and
(1 + ￿)~ nt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿n)nt￿1 + [1 ￿ ￿(!t￿1)] ~ nt￿1 (46)
(1 + ￿)bt =  ￿G
￿ ￿ Wt
￿
+ [1 ￿ ￿(!t￿1)]bt￿1 (47)
(1 + ￿)nt = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)nt￿1 + ￿(!t￿1)(bt￿1 + ~ nt￿1) (48)
Market tightness is given by
!t =
bt + ~ nt
ht ￿ bt ￿ ~ nt ￿ ft ￿ nt
(49)
43If there were a small moving cost involved in temporarily moving into a rented home, mismatched owners
would strictly prefer to remain in their own homes while searching.
40and the housing stock evolves according to
(1 + ￿)ht+1 = ht + ￿
￿ (nt + ~ nt + bt + ft)(￿EtVt+1 ￿ ￿ q)
￿ : (50)
When we change the model in this way and retain the same calibration targets as before
we ￿nd that our results hardly change. If the parameters of the model were held constant,
this change would lead to a somewhat tighter housing market. In this case, however, the
implied steady-state fraction of renters would be too low compared to the data. To match this
target, we would therefore increase the fraction of entering households that become perpetual
renters rather than searchers (i.e. decrease  ).44 Following this this re-calibration, market
tightness remains much as in our baseline case.
7.2 Endogenous exit
In the baseline model, we assume the exit rate of home-owners is exogenous. We now
consider the implications of allowing the exit rate to be determined and vary endogenously.
Speci￿cally, suppose those homeowners who have the opportunity to exit the city receive a
random draw from a distribution of continuation values. Only those who receive draws that
exceed their value of staying, Jt, actually choose to exit. We suppose that these draws come
from a uniform distribution of continuation values with support [0; ￿ Z]. The implied value









+ ￿￿Et(1 ￿ ￿net+1)(Wt+1 + Vt+1)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)Et(1 ￿ ￿net+1)Jt+1; (51)
where Z￿
t =
￿ ￿ Z2 ￿ J2
t
￿
=2 ￿ Z and et = 1 ￿ Jt= ￿ Z is the exit probability conditional on having
an opportunity. The extended model is set up and calibrated so that the steady-state is the
same as before. This includes calibrating ￿ Z so that the expected exit value is the same as it
was in the baseline model. The relevant elasticities are re-calibrated to match the volatilities
of population, construction and sales growth.
In this case, the resulting dynamics remain qualitatively unchanged. Quantitatively,
price volatility is slightly higher and momentum slightly lower than in baseline case. This
re￿ ects the fact that in response to a positive income shock, the exit rate initially declines
slightly, then gradually returns to its steady-state. The overall e⁄ect, however, is small.
This example is somewhat arbitrary in the sense that a uniform distribution of continuation
44Equivalently, we could lower the rate at which renters become searchers (see footnote 19).
41values is assumed. Nevertheless, it does illustrate that it is possible to extend the model in
this way without changing the main results.
7.3 Competitive search
Under competitive search we suppose that the housing market consists of a variety of sub-
markets. Each sub-market is characterized by a pair, (!t;Pt), where Pt is the price of a
house in the sub-market and !t is the tightness of the sub-market. Search is competitive in
the sense that all buyers and sellers take the prices and tightness of all sub-markets as given,
and then decide which single sub-market to enter and search for a trade. There is no cost
to entering any sub-market.
By entering sub-market (!t;Pt), a seller sells a house at Pt with probability ￿ (!t). The
seller chooses to enter a sub-market that maximizes his/her expected return. It follows that




￿ (!t)Pt + [1 ￿ ￿ (!t)]￿Et~ Vt+1
o
: (52)
Free entry of sellers implies that all active sub-markets (i.e. sub-markets with ￿;￿ 2
(0;1)) in equilibrium must o⁄er the sellers the same payo⁄Vt, although (!t;Pt) varies across
sub-markets. It follows that the relationship between the listed price and market tightness
that must be satis￿ed by all active sub-markets:
￿ (!t(Pt)) =
Vt ￿ ￿Et~ Vt+1
Pt ￿ ￿Et~ Vt+1
: (53)
Thus, it is su¢ cient to index sub-markets by the posted price Pt alone.
Buyers also decide in each period which sub-market to enter. The value of being a buyer





f￿(!t(Pt))(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt) + [1 ￿ ￿(!t(Pt))]￿EtWt+1g: (54)
In equilibrium, the set of active sub-markets is complete in the sense that there is no other
sub-market that could improve the welfare of any buyer or seller.
Let ￿(!t) denote the elasticity of the measure of matches with respect to the measure of
buyers. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. In a competitive search equilibrium, there is only one active sub-market.
In this market, the share of the surplus from house transactions that accrues to the buyer is
42equal to the elasticity of the measure of matches with respect to the measure of buyers:45
￿(!t) = ￿(!t): (55)
Therefore, the implication of competitive search in this model is that the respective shares
of the trade surplus accruing to buyers and sellers in a transaction depends on the tightness
of the market. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas matching function, this amounts to imposing
the restriction that ￿ = ￿. When we impose this restriction in our calibration scheme, it is
no longer possible to match the volatility of sales growth. Moreover, we are unable to to ￿nd
a combination of ￿ and ￿ such that we match both the relative volatilities of construction
and population growth. We therefore set ￿ = 1:6 as in our baseline calibration and choose
￿ = 5:5 to match ￿h=￿y. Under this calibration scheme, the competitive search model
generates qualitatively similar price dynamics to the baseline case. Quantitatively, however,
house prices are more volatile and exhibit less momentum.
In contrast to the random search model with Nash Bargaining, the nature of the matching
function now matters because the bargaining parameter depends on market tightness. To
explore this issue, we consider an alternative matching function for which the equilibrium
shares of the surplus received by the buyers and sellers are not constant. Speci￿cally, consider
M(B;S) = S￿(1 ￿ e
￿￿ B
S ): (56)
If ￿ = 1, the matching probabilities are equivalent to the ￿urn-ball￿matching process as-
sumed by Diaz and Jerez (2012). Here we consider a somewhat more general form in order to
calibrate the model to the same targets as for our baseline calibration above. This general-
ization could be motivated along the lines of Albrecht, Gauthier, and Vroman (2003), where
￿ denotes the average number of applications to purchase made per period and ￿ indexes
the e⁄ort required to process each application. Given the other parameters of our baseline
calibration, the matching function parameter values needed to achieve the same targets as
above are ￿ = 0:78 and ￿ = 3:73.
The surplus accruing to the buyer for this matching function is




which is decreasing in market tightness !. That is, as the ratio of buyers to sellers increases,
the share received by buyers falls.
45This result is a special case of that derived in Moen (1997).
43Figure 7 illustrates the e⁄ect of a shock to general earnings on house prices for each of
the matching functions. Clearly, the form of the matching function has a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on price momentum, and this can be traced to the e⁄ect of an increase in local earnings on
the initial response of prices and the extent of entry. In the urn-ball matching case, the share
of the surplus received by the buyer falls as tightness rises. Thus, the initial price increase
in prices is greater, and this discourages entry as can be seen in the response of tightness.
Since tightness responds less, prices peak earlier and return to their steady-state level faster
than with Cobb-Douglas matching. As a result, price volatility is higher and momentum






















































Figure 7: IRFs for Price under Competitive Search with Alternative Matching Functions
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we provide a parsimonious characterization
of the impact of relative income shocks across U.S. cities on the short-run dynamics of average
house prices, sales of existing homes, construction and population growth. Speci￿cally we
estimate a panel VAR with city-level ￿xed e⁄ects and use it to isolate the impact of relative
income shocks by making structural assumptions consistent with our theory. In particular,
our estimates are consistent with previous ￿ndings (e.g. those of Glaeser et al. 2010) that
44house price appreciation exhibits substantial serial correlation in the short term and long-run
mean reversion. Moreover, we ￿nd that the volatility of house price movements that occur
in response to income shocks is high relative to the volatility of local incomes. City level
population growth responds quite quickly in response to income shocks, whereas construction
rates tend to be sluggish initially. Sales growth is volatile, slowing quickly after an initial
peak before rising again in the medium term.
Our second main contribution is to build a model that helps to understand the joint
dynamics of income, house prices, sales, construction and population growth. To do this,
we introduce time-consuming search and matching into a dynamic model of housing markets
with endogenous entry and construction. Three key features of the model are (1) that it
takes time for potential buyers to match with a house they want, and the length of this
time depends on market conditions; (2) that home buyers foresee that they will eventually
sell; and (3) that unoccupied housing can be rented temporarily to new entrants who are
searching for a home to own.
In response to a persistent, relative increase in local income, entry into the market rises
persistently. Because it takes time to match and new houses take time to build, the ratio of
potential buyers to houses for sale rise slowly over time. Initially, therefore, the liquidity of
houses is expected to rise over time. Since this causes the re-sale value of housing to grow and
because current transactions prices in part re￿ ect this, the current transaction price grows
in anticipation. Higher home values induce increased construction so that the buyer￿ seller
ratio, and hence housing liquidity, eventually fall. After initially growing for several periods,
therefore, current house prices fall.
The fact that households can rent while searching implies that they can obtain the relative
gains from living in the city without buying a house. Although an increase in local income
therefore also increases the demand for rental housing, owners of unoccupied housing have
an incentive to rent out their houses and delay selling them, if they expect prices to rise.
Consequently entry continues to grow and is not immediately stemmed by a sharp rise in
rents.
We calibrate the model so that its steady-state matches several long-run averages in U.S.
data and allow the volatilities of population growth, construction, and sales growth determine
three key elasticities which are indeterminate in the steady-state. We ￿nd that the calibrated
version of our model captures qualitatively the observed dynamics of both house prices quite
well. In particular, the model generates serial correlation in price appreciation and relatively
high volatility in the long run. Quantitatively, the calibrated model accounts for more than
4580% of the variance of house prices associated with local income shocks, and nearly half of
the ￿rst-order autocorrelation of price growth. Moreover, the search model improves both
qualitatively and quantitatively on one with no search along multiple dimensions.
Our objective in this paper has been to assess the extent to which search and matching
in the housing market can help us to understand the relationship between city-level housing
price dynamics and city-level fundamentals. The modelling choices we have made are
intended to allow us to focus on these issues in a tractable and parsimonious fashion and
to permit us to quantify the key mechanisms at play. Our model could, however, be
generalized in various directions to study a number of other issues associated with housing
markets. In particular, one could allow for heterogeneity both in incomes and housing
quality and consider the role of income inequality in determining housing price dispersion.
Alternatively, one could allow for heterogeneity in housing supply conditions across cities
and assess the performance of the model on a city-by-city basis. We leave these issues for
future research.
46Appendix A: Data appendix
This appendix provides details on data sources, de￿nitions and calculations. Our unit of
observation is a core-based statistical area (metropolitan statistical area or MSA). We use
the 2006 MSA de￿nitions. Our sample consists of 106 MSAs from 1980 to 2008.
Local incomes: We de￿ne local incomes as the total income from all sources. Our MSA
level data are from the Regional Economic Accounts compiled by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA, Table CA01). We could have subtracted construction earnings because they
are endogenous in our model. Because of missing values in the construction earnings data
for some cities, however, this would have reduced our panel size by about 10%. For the
remaining cities, whether or not we make this adjustment makes no signi￿cant di⁄erence
to the empirical results. We could also have de￿ned local income as earnings before taxes
and transfers. We chose not to because we would expect the incentives to move to a given
location to depend on total income. However, when we estimate the panel VAR using this
de￿nition instead, the results were qualitatively similar.
House prices: Following van Niewenburgh and Weil (2010), we form a time series of home
prices for each city by combining level information from the 2000 Census with time series
information from the FHFA. From the 2000 Census, we use nominal home values for the
median single-family home. From the FHFA we use the Home Price Index (HPI) from 1980
to 2008. The HPI is a repeat-sales index for single family properties purchased or re￿nanced
with a mortgage below the conforming loan limit. As a repeat-sale index, it is a constant
quality house price index. In contrast to Van Niewenburgh and Weil (2010), we combine
prices for MSA divisions into those for MSAs by using population￿ weighted averages of the
division level prices. We need to do this because the housing stock data (described below)
can only be constructed using permits at the MSA level.
Sales of existing houses: We obtained quarterly estimates of the sales of existing houses
for each city from Moody￿ s Analytics (www.economy.com). Annual sales were computed as
the sum of quarterly sales over the year.
Populations: City populations are taken from the BEAs Regional Economic Accounts
(Table C02). Throughout we assume that city populations are proportional to the number
of households. Although there has been a general decline in people per household in the
U.S., this is an economy￿ wide trend that is removed after controlling for time￿ ￿xed e⁄ects.
47Housing Stocks: We form a time series for housing stocks for each city by combining
information from the 2000 Census with times series information from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). From the 2000 Census, we use the estimated
number of housing units. This data was only available at the county level, so we summed
across the counties within the relevant MSAs. From HUD we used annual permits issued for
each city from 1980 to 2008. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 97.5%
of permits issued each year translate into housing starts, 96% of which are completed. We
therefore constructed housing stocks Ht according to Ht+1 = Ht + 0:936￿Permitst:
Construction Employment: Construction employment is taken from the BEAs Regional
Economic Accounts (Table C25).
Construction Wages: These are computed as construction earnings divided by construc-
tion employment. The earnings data is taken from the BEAs Regional Economic Accounts
(Table C06).
Rents: Rent data is taken from the data set constructed by van Niewerburgh and Weill
(2010). They start with rental data from the Fair Market Rents database (FMR), published
annually by HUD. The FMR are gross rents, including utilities, and are used to determine
payment amounts in various government housing subsidy programs. The FMR reports the
40th (or sometimes the 45th or 50th) percentile of the housing rent distribution, the dollar
amount below which 40 percent of the standard-quality rental housing units are rented in
a given area. The 40th percentile rent is drawn from the distribution of rents of all units
occupied by recent movers, who moved to their present residence within the past 15 months.
The FMR data are reported for ￿ner regions than the metropolitan areas used by the BEA.
Van Niewerburgh and Weill (2010) aggregate to the MSA level using population weighted
averages. Van Niewerburgh and Weill (2010) also adjust for the fact that the reported rent
percentile actually changes over time (see their appendix D.3 for details).
48Appendix B: Math appendix















t [yt + wtlt ￿ ￿t] (58)
where ￿t denotes the net value of all housing transactions. It follows their dynamic opti-







t [yt + wtlt ￿ v(lt) + zt ￿ ￿t] (59)
The solution to the (static) household construction labour supply problem yields (13). Hence,




















The deterministic steady-state: In a steady-state (32) implies that the normalized
measure of renters is
f
￿ =
(1 ￿  )￿G( ￿ W ￿)
￿ + ￿f
: (61)
Similarly, from (33) the measure of buyers each period satis￿es
b
￿ =
 ￿G( ￿ W ￿)









￿ + ￿n + ￿(1 ￿ ￿n)
b
￿; (63)




￿ (n￿ + b￿ + f￿)
￿
(￿V
￿ ￿ ￿ q)
￿ : (64)
where ￿ q = ￿ cF ￿1(h￿=^ h).
49In the steady-state, the values of owners, buyers and vacant houses, the house price and
rent, must satisfy the following set of equations:
J
￿ = ￿ u
H + ￿n￿Z + ￿n￿V
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿n)￿￿ (W
￿ + V
￿) + (1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿)￿J
￿ (65)
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￿ = ￿ (!
￿)P















f = ￿ u




￿ =  W
￿ + (1 ￿  )W
￿
f; (71)
where ￿ uH = ￿ y + x(w￿) + zH ￿ m and ￿ uR = ￿ y + x(w￿) ￿ r￿ and we assume that when a
household exits the city, its expected continuation value is the steady-state value of being a
renter: Z = ￿ uR=(1 ￿ ￿). The ￿rst ￿ve equations of this system can be solved for J￿, W ￿;
V ￿, P ￿ and r￿. Then, the last two equations can be used to determine ￿ W ￿ and W ￿
f.
Proof of Lemma 1. Re-arranging (68) yields
P





Substituting the above into (65), (66), (67) and (69) yield
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H + ￿n￿Z + ￿n￿V
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Given (16), (19) and (75), we have
￿ u
H ￿ ￿ u
R = z
H + ￿ (!
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(1 ￿ ￿n)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
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which implies (38). QED

















￿ (n￿ + b￿ + f)
￿
(￿V
￿ ￿ ￿ q)
￿ : (79)
It follows that (39) can be obtained by substituting (61), (62) and (63) into the above. It
follows that V S(!￿) is strictly decreasing in !￿ because ￿0(!) > 0 from Assumption 1. QED
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (38) into (73) yields (40). Also recall from Assumption
1 that ￿
0(!) < 0 and ￿0(!) > 0. It follows that the right-hand side of (40) is increasing in
!￿. QED
Proof of Proposition 1. Because V S(!) is decreasing in ! and V D(!) is increasing in !￿,
a SSE must be unique if it exists. Existence of an interior SSE basically requires that the
curves intersect at a value of ! 2 (!; ￿ !). That is if V D(!) < V S (!) and V D(￿ !) > V S (￿ !).
Recall from Assumption 1 that ￿(￿ !) ￿ 0, ￿ (!) ￿ 0, ￿(!) = ￿ (￿ !) = 1, ￿
0(!) < 0 and
￿0(!) > 0. It follows that necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the parameters are that
￿ (!)(1 ￿ ￿)￿zH
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  (￿ + ￿f)








(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)] + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿n￿)￿￿(￿ !)
:
(81)
51In the Cobb-Douglas case, ! = ￿
1
1￿￿ and ￿ ! = ￿￿ 1
￿, so that ￿ (!) = ￿
1




Proof of Proposition 2. The value of being a mis-matched owner who remains in their
house while they search for a new one is given by
~ Jt = yt + xt ￿ m + ￿(!t)(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt + ￿EtVt+1) + (1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿Et ~ Jt+1: (82)
The value of becoming a renter immediately and putting the vacant house up for sale is given
by
Wt + Vt = u
R
t + ￿(!t)(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt)
+(1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿EtWt+1 + ￿(!t)Pt + (1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿EtVt+1
= u
R
t + ￿(!t)(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt)
+(1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿EtWt+1 + ￿(!t)(1 ￿ ￿)￿Et (Jt+1 ￿ Wt+1)
+￿(!t)￿￿EtVt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿EtVt+1
= yt + xt ￿ rt + ￿(!t)(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt + ￿EtVt+1)
+￿(!t)(1 ￿ ￿))￿Et (Jt+1 ￿ Wt+1 ￿ Vt+1)
+(1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿ (EtWt+1 + EtVt+1): (83)
Given (30), the above implies that
Wt + Vt = yt + xt ￿ m + ￿(!t)(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt + ￿EtVt+1)
+(1 ￿ ￿(!t))￿Et [Wt+1 + Vt+1]: (84)
Since limT!1 ￿
TEt ~ Jt+T = limT!1 ￿
TEt [WT+1 + VT+1] = 0, solving forwards implies that
~ Jt = Wt + Vt: (85)
QED





t(Pt)(￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt ￿ ￿EtWt+1) ￿ ￿(!t(Pt)) = 0; (86)
where !t(Pt) and !0
t(Pt) are implicitly determined by (53). This implies
￿EtJt+1 ￿ Pt ￿ ￿EtWt+1






52which can be used together with (53) to solve for Pt, given the values EtJt+1, EtWt+1 and
Et~ Vt+1. Then one can solve for !t from (53). Note that (53) implies that !0
t(Pt) < 0 given
￿0(!) > 0 from Assumption 1.
The trade surplus in the housing market is strictly positive. Given the boundary condition
limT!1 ￿
TEtJt+T = 0, it is clear that the household￿ s equilibrium values are bounded, which
implies that the trade surplus is also bounded. Thus ￿EtJt+1￿￿EtWt+1￿￿EtVt+1 2 (0;1),
where we have incorporated that V = ~ V in the equilibrium. Recall condition (ix) of the
equilibrium de￿nition that ￿ (!t); ￿(!t) 2 (0;1) for all active sub-markets. Also recall
from part (ii) of Assumption 1 that ￿
0(!) < 0, ￿0(!) > 0. These conditions imply that













De￿ne LHS (Pt) as the left-hand side of (87) and RHS (Pt) the right-hand side. Given (88),





Because ￿(!) 2 (0;1), we have RHS (Pt) 2 (0;1) for all Pt. Moreover, recall !0
t(Pt) < 0
from (53) and ￿0 (!) ￿ 0 from Assumption 1. Thus RHS0 (Pt) ￿ 0.
For any given Vt, Jt, Wt, one can verify that LHS0 (Pt) < 0 because ￿EtJt+1￿￿EtWt+1￿
￿EtVt+1 > 0. Recall from (23) and (24) that the price in an active sub-market satis￿es
￿EtVt+1 ￿ Pt ￿ ￿EtJt+1 ￿ ￿EtWt+1: (90)
It follows that
LHS(Pt = ￿EtVt+1) = 1 > RHS(Pt = ￿EtVt+1) (91)
LHS (Pt = ￿EtJt+1 ￿ ￿EtWt+1) = 0 < RHS (Pt = ￿EtJt+1 ￿ ￿EtWt+1); (92)
where the two inequalities are because RHS (Pt) 2 (0;1) for all Pt. The above results imply
a unique P ￿
t 2 (￿EtVt+1; ￿EtJt+1 ￿ ￿EtWt+1) that satis￿es

















and a unique !￿
t(P ￿













53Thus, there is a single active sub-market in the directed search equilibrium.







where ￿(!) denotes the buyer￿ s share of the surplus in a sub-market with tightness !. The
right-hand side of the above is the ratio of the elasticities of the number of matches with
respect to the numbers of buyers and sellers. It follows that ￿(!) = ￿(!). QED
An alternative economy without search: New entrants can either rent or purchase
a house immediately and move in. Since households derive more utility from owning and
construction costs are the same, only pure renters will choose to rent in equilibrium. In this
case, the dynamic system is given by








(1 + ￿)ht+1 = ht + ￿￿
1+￿ (nt + ft)(￿EtPt+1 ￿ qt)
￿ (98)
ht = nt + ft (99)
Jt = u
H





t + ￿f￿Z + (1 ￿ ￿f)￿EtW
f
t+1 (101)
￿ Wt =   (Jt ￿ Pt) + (1 ￿  )W
f
t (102)
rt = m + Pt ￿ ￿EtPt+1 (103)
An important di⁄erence to the model studied by Glaeser et al. (2010) is that, in their
paper, the alternative to living in the city yields a homogeneous payo⁄so that the elasticity
of entry is e⁄ectively in￿nite. In response to a shock, this implies immediate entry of buyers
until the price of housing adjusts to keep the value of entering constant. This tends to
generate high variance in both prices and construction in response to income shocks. In our
model there is a distribution of alternatives, so that as households enter, the critical outside
value rises. This determines the ￿ ow of additional households into the city.
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59On-line Appendix C: Empirical Results
Full Panel VAR Results
Table C1 documents the parameter estimates for the baseline estimation of the Panel VAR
discussed in Section 2. Estimating a panel VAR raises a number of econometric issues. A
basic problem in dynamic panel data models with ￿xed e⁄ects is that the lagged dependent
variables are, by construction, correlated with the individual e⁄ects. This renders the least
squares estimator biased and inconsistent. Consistent estimation requires some transfor-
mation to eliminate ￿xed e⁄ects. A within transformation wipes out the individual e⁄ects
by taking deviations from sample means, but the resulting within-group estimator is in-
consistent when the number of panels becomes large for a given time-dimension (Nickell,
1981).
Table C1: System GMM (2SLS) estimates
Y P gS gH gN
Y (￿1) 1.23 (0.05) 0.45 (0.09) 0.38 (0.23) 0.01 (0.01) 0.06 (0.02)
P(￿1) -0.01 (0.01) 1.37 (0.04) -0.53 (0.08) 0.01 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00)
gS(￿1) 0.00 (0.00) -0.06 (0.01) 0.07 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
gH(￿1) 0.74 (0.12) 1.28 (0.26) 0.06 (0.83) 0.74 (0.04) 0.39 (0.09)
gN(￿1) -0.23 (0.17) 0.15 (0.28) 2.23 (1.23) 0.08 (0.04) 0.24 (0.19)
Y (￿2) -0.33 (0.05) -0.61 (0.08) -0.47 (0.22) -0.02 (0.01) -0.06 (0.03)
P(￿2) 0.02 (0.01) -0.46 (0.05) 0.63 (0.08) -0.01 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
gS(￿2) -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
gH(￿2) -0.67 (0.09) -1.30 (0.19) -2.77 (0.60) -0.14 (0.03) -0.21 (0.04)
gN(￿2) 0.16 (0.06) 0.53 (0.12) 1.02 (0.38) 0.03 (0.01) 0.16 (0.05)
Standard errors in parenthesis. No. of observations = 2438
Given this inconsistency, the literature focuses mainly on a ￿rst-di⁄erence transforma-
tion to eliminate the individual e⁄ect while handling the remaining correlation with the
(transformed) error term using instrumental variables and GMM estimators (e.g. Arellano
and Bond, 1991). However, the Arellano-Bond estimator is known to su⁄er from a weak
instruments problem when the relevant time series are highly persistent, as they are in our
case. As Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate this can result in large ￿nite-sample biases.
In our baseline estimation we use the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator is consistent when the number
1of panels becomes large for a given time-dimension and is less likely to su⁄er from the weak
instruments problem. Another reason for focussing on this estimator is that its properties
are fairly well understood and it has been studied in the context of panel VARs by Binder,
Hsiao and Pesaren (2005).
Analysis of Regional Sub-samples
Table C2: Moments from system GMM estimation for regional sub-samples ￿
income shock
Region Relative Corr. with Corr. with Autocorrelation
Std. Dev. Inc. Growth Price App. year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4
Income Coastal 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.27 0.01 -0.07 -0.06
Growth Interior 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.14 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10
Sunbelt 1.00 1.00 0.51 0.34 0.12 0.02 -0.04
Price Coastal 1.71 0.76 1.00 0.69 0.20 -0.12 -0.23
Appreciation Interior 1.10 0.68 1.00 0.69 0.31 -0.02 -0.25
Sunbelt 0.89 0.51 1.00 0.89 0.66 0.42 0.20
Sales Growth Coastal 3.11 0.19 -0.33 0.90 0.83 0.74 0.65
(existing) Interior 1.11 0.30 -0.01 0.69 0.54 0.47 0.42
Sunbelt 2.21 0.66 -0.09 0.81 0.58 0.45 0.38
Construction Coastal 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.92 0.79 0.68 0.61
Rate Interior 0.15 0.52 0.66 0.88 0.66 0.45 0.27
Sunbelt 0.15 0.63 0.65 0.86 0.57 0.27 0.02
Population Coastal 0.15 0.04 -0.30 0.93 0.88 0.83 0.77
Growth Interior 0.11 0.70 0.39 0.60 0.32 0.16 0.13
Sunbelt 0.35 0.79 0.26 0.73 0.48 0.26 0.11
We now consider the results of estimating the panel VAR model on various sub-samples
of both cities and time periods. Table C2 provides key moments for local earnings, house
prices, construction rates, and ratios of housing stocks to city population based on shocks to
local income in the panel VAR for each of the three sub-samples. Several, key observations
are apparent. The standard deviation of house prices is roughly equal to that of local
earnings in the full sample. Both construction rates and housing stock-population ratios
are much less volatile than local earnings. House prices, construction rates and housing
stock-population ratios are all strongly positively correlated with local earnings, although
for inland cities these correlations are somewhat weaker. The higher and more persistent
2autocorrelation in both house price appreciation and population growth relative to earnings
growth can also be observed in all the sub-samples.
Certain features of these moments and impulse response functions in Figure 8 conform to
a priori expectations regarding population and price movements. In particular, coastal cities
typically have more inelastic land supply than sunbelt cities. Accordingly, in response to
demand shocks, price volatility tends to be higher and population and construction volatility




















































































































































































There are several potential problems with using the system GMM estimator for a sample
with the dimensions considered here. While it is usually thought to be suitable for typical
microeconometric panels, with only a few waves but a large number of individuals, here we
have moderately large number of cities and a moderately long time series. Moreover, GMM
estimators tend to have a larger standard error compared to the within-group estimator and
may su⁄er from a ￿nite sample bias due to weak instruments. Here we address these issues
by comparing our estimates with those of two alternative estimators: OLS with no ￿xed
e⁄ects and a standard within-groups estimator (WGE). Although the WGE is inconsistent
as the number of panels becomes large, this should be less of a problem given the dimensions
of our sample.
For the sake of brevity we do not report here all of the estimation results for each
estimator. Instead Table B3 reports only the sum of the coe¢ cients on the lagged dependent
variables for each equation under each estimator, as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998).
As may be seem, the OLS estimates yields the most persistent processes for each variable.
This re￿ ects the upward bias due to the fact any ￿xed e⁄ect is attributed to persistent
e⁄ects of the shocks. The WGE etimates yield the least persistent processes, which re￿ ects
the downward bias. The system GMM (2SLS) estimator implies persistence that lie between
these two extremes.
Table C3: Implied persistence: sum of coe¢ cients on lagged dependent variable
Equation WGE 2SLS OLS
Y 0.90 0.90 0.99
P 0.87 0.92 0.98
gS -0.12 -0.11 -0.03
gH 0.60 0.60 0.72
gN 0.06 0.40 0.45
Table C4 documents the same set of moments as we have previously considered, for each
of the estimators. While there are clearly some di⁄erences across estimators, the same broad
pattern emerges as that depicted in Table 2. The biggest outliers come from those based on
OLS estimation. This is because the omission of city level ￿xed e⁄ects forces any permament
di⁄erences to show up as high persistence. The system GMM (2SLS) estimator implies a
price appreciation response that is the most volatile and the least persistent.
4Table C4: Moments from estimation using alternative estimators ￿income
shocks
Estimator Relative Corr. with Corr. with Autocorrelation
Std. Dev. Inc. Growth Price App. year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4
Income WGE 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.24 0.04 -0.04 -0.09
Growth 2SLS 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.28 0.03 -0.06 -0.09
OLS 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.21 0.08 0.02 -0.00
Price WGE 1.90 0.67 1.00 0.81 0.48 0.12 -0.19
Growth 2SLS 1.60 0.76 1.00 0.75 0.36 0.05 -0.15
OLS 1.22 0.47 1.00 0.88 0.60 0.31 0.09
Sales WGE 1.75 0.60 0.02 0.57 0.11 -0.15 0.27
Growth 2SLS 1.32 0.56 0.01 0.59 0.39 0.35 0.35
OLS 1.98 0.59 0.12 0.71 0.37 0.25 0.25
Cons. WGE 0.12 0.41 0.90 0.84 0.47 0.09 -0.20
Rate 2SLS 0.11 0.55 0.80 0.88 0.61 0.33 0.11
OLS 0.40 0.19 0.44 0.98 0.95 0.91 0.88
Pop. WGE 0.16 0.89 0.84 0.57 0.20 -0.07 -0.25
Growth 2SLS 0.17 0.75 0.60 0.67 0.40 0.19 0.09
OLS 0.38 0.47 0.55 0.91 0.84 0.77 0.73
Alternative Speci￿cations
Table C5 documents the relevant moments due to income shocks from the panel VAR for two
alternative speci￿cations.46 The ￿rst speci￿cation, labelled "AR(2) Income", restricts the
equation for income so that income depends only on its own lagged values. The speci￿cation
labelled "All growth" uses growth rates of per capita incomes and prices in the VAR rather
than levels. As may be seen by comparing to Table 2, restricting the income process to
be univariate has negligible e⁄ects. This suggest thats lagged feedback e⁄ects of prices and
population on per capita income are of second order importance. Specifying the VAR so
that incomes and prices are in growth rates rather than in log levels has somewhat larger
e⁄ects on our results, but does not change the broad conclusions. Note that, by construction,
the level of relative income under this speci￿cation is permanently high following a shock.
However, this has little impact on the moments that we consider here.
46We have considered others including alternative de￿nitions of the construction rate and other de￿nitions
of income. Similar patterns emerge in all cases.
5Table C5: Moments from system GMM estimation for alternative
speci￿cations ￿income shocks
Speci￿cation Relative Corr. with Corr. with Autocorrelation
Std. Dev. Inc. Growth Price Growth year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4
Income AR(2) Income 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.26 0.02 -0.05 -0.07
Growth All growth 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.01
Price AR(2) Income 1.62 0.74 1.00 0.76 0.38 0.07 -0.12
Growth All growth 1.10 0.47 1.00 0.87 0.58 0.30 0.10
Sales AR(2) Income 1.40 0.58 -0.02 0.62 0.44 0.40 0.41
Growth All growth 1.34 0.83 0.16 0.44 -0.08 -0.23 -0.26
Cons. AR(2) Income 0.13 0.52 0.74 0.90 0.68 0.45 0.26
Rate All growth 0.13 0.44 0.98 0.90 0.67 0.42 0.23
Pop. AR(2) Income 0.17 0.77 0.57 0.68 0.42 0.22 0.12
Growth All growth 0.18 0.85 0.85 0.69 0.40 0.20 0.07
Conversion to quarterly income shock process
If we now think of a period as a quarter, we can write an annual AR(2) process as
xt = b1xt￿4 + b2xt￿8 + "t: (104)
Let yt = xt￿4. Then we can write this as a stacked system given by



















Now consider a VAR(1) given by
Xt = AXt￿1 + vt; (107)
where vt = [vt 0]




2vt￿2 + Avt￿1 + vt: (108)
It follows that A = B
1
4 and et = A3vt￿3 + A2vt￿2 + Avt￿1 + vt. We can decompose the
VAR(1) as
xt = a11xt￿1 + a12yt￿1 + vt (109)
yt = a21xt￿1 + a22yt￿1: (110)
6Since yt = xt￿4, it follows that
xt = a11xt￿1 + a12xt￿5 + vt (111)
xt￿4 = a21xt￿1 + a22xt￿5: (112)
Substituting out xt￿5 yields
xt = a11xt￿1 +
a12
a22










xt￿4 + vt: (114)
Thus the AR(2) process at the annual frequency translates into a particular AR(4) process
at the quarterly frequency. There is, of course, a loss of information.
Full results of sensitivity analysis for elasticities
Table C6: Volatilities and Comovements: Sensitivity Results
New construction Entry (demand) Matching Land supply
supply elasticity elasticity Elasticity elasticity
Moment Baseline ￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 10 ￿ = 3 ￿ = 20 ￿ = :5 ￿ = :9 ￿ = :5 ￿ = 5
￿p=￿y 1.45 2.92 0.83 0.48 2.63 1.59 1.28 1.83 1.30
￿s=￿y 1.32 0.83 1.67 1.12 1.59 0.87 2.04 1.04 1.45
￿h=￿y 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.13
￿n=￿y 0.17 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.19
￿py 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.67 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98
￿sy 0.11 0.33 0.02 0.22 0.01 -0.25 0.28 0.17 0.08
￿hy 0.26 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.26
￿ny 0.50 0.60 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.49
￿sp 0.07 0.33 -0.10 -0.39 0.09 -0.25 0.20 0.16 0.02
7Table C7: Autocorrelations: Sensitivity Results
Labour supply Entry (demand) Matching Land supply
elasticity elasticity Elasticity elasticity
Moment Baseline ￿ = :1 ￿ = 10 ￿ = 3 ￿ = 20 ￿ = :5 ￿ = :9 ￿ = :5 ￿ = 5
￿
p
1 0.34 0.27 0.44 0.76 0.24 0.32 0.38 0.31 0.36
￿
p
2 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.45 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.09
￿
p
3 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.24 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02
￿
p
4 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
￿s
1 0.52 0.34 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.43 0.48 0.53
￿s
2 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.09 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.18
￿s
3 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.03
￿s
4 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05
￿h
1 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96
￿h
2 0.90 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90
￿h
3 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83
￿h
4 0.77 0.84 0.74 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.76
￿n
1 0.84 0.74 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.85
￿n
2 0.66 0.46 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.68
￿n
3 0.54 0.29 0.59 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.56
￿n
4 0.45 0.17 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.47
On-line Appendix D: A Multi-City Environment
There are M symmetric cities, indexed by i = 1;:::;M, where M is ￿nite, but large in the
sense that no individual city has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on aggregate quantities. The cities can
be of identical or di⁄erent sizes; what is important is that they all be small in this sense.
We will focus on City 1, which will correspond to the representative or average city that was
considered in the text.
Each city can be described as in Section 3, except that here city-speci￿c quantities are
indexed by i. In particular, at each point in time, income in City i is denoted e yi. De￿ne
average income across all cities by y =
M P
i=1
e yi, and let yi ￿
e yi
y . We will assume that in the
steady-state, yi = 1 for all i. We will think of the deviation of City 1 income from the
average, y1, as following a stochastic process just as in the text. This is straightforward
under the assumption that City 1 is small so that ￿ uctuations in e y1 have no e⁄ect on y.
Alternatively, we can dispense with yi and consider ￿ uctuations in the level of City i income,
e yi. What is important in what follows is that the shocks considered be truly city-speci￿c.
8That is, that ￿ uctuations in either y1 or e y1, have negligible e⁄ects on income and/or housing
market conditions in all other cities.
As in the text, the population of the economy is given by Qt, and grows at gross rate
1+￿. Every period, each new household that enters the economy draws M potential amenity
values, ai 2 [0;a] (one for each city), from distributions Fi(a), for i = 1;:::M. Here for
simplicity we will assume Fi(￿) = F(￿) for all i., and that a is su¢ ciently large that a positive
measure of households chooses to enter all cities in each time period. Amenity values are
in utils, and like both consumption and housing services enter households￿utility linearly.
Utility from amenities, also like that from income, is realized only when the household chooses
a particular city in which to live, and locates there.
For each new household j, let W ij denote the value of being a new entrant to City i,
de￿ned just as in (10). Since new entrants to any city are identical, variation in W ij across
households is induced solely by variation in the amenity value, aij; in particular, Fi(W(a)) =
Fi(a) = F(a) where a is the amenity value that generates W(a) given all other city attributes
(income, house prices, the housing market tightness, etc.). Let "j ￿ max[W 2j;:::;W Mj].
That is, "j denotes the highest alternative value to entering City 1 for each new household
j. Since M is ￿nite, " exists for all new households and identi￿es a single best alternative
with probability 1. Similarly, the probability that "j = W 1j, that is that a household is
indi⁄erent between entering City 1 and some other city, approaches zero as M becomes large.
Let G(") denote the distribution of the highest alternative value, ", across households.
In a situation in which all cities other than City 1 are identical, "jis the value of entering




where a￿ 2 [0;a] is the amenity value which generates the maximum value ". Note, however,
that for G(") to be well-de￿ned, it is not required for all cities other than City 1 to be
identical. Finally, note that the entry cuto⁄, "c
t, in this case satis￿es "c
t = W 1t, just as in
(9). That is, any household with a maximum alternative value below W 1t enters City 1.
When a household leaves their city of residence due to the realization of a relocation
shock (which happens with probability ￿ for both home-owners and permanent renters),
we assume that they are e⁄ectively in the same situation as a new household who has just
arrived in the economy. That is, they re-draw, in the current period, from the amenity
distribution for each city, and choose the city which yields the highest value. The expected
continuation value following a relocation shock for any household currently resident in any
9city is thus given by
Z = " ￿
Z
G(")d": (116)
From (116) it is clear that Z depends only on the distribution of amenity values, F(￿).
Also, note that since City 1 is small, the probability that a household which exits it due to
a relocation shock returns immediately is negligible.
Let POPt denote the population of City 1 in period t. The population evolves via







where Zt denotes the measure of agents that exit all other cities in period t, and is assumed
to be una⁄ected by conditions in City 1. On the balanced growth path, we assume ￿rst
that all cities are symmetric, so that G(W 1t) = 1=M for all t. Similarly, Zt = M(Nt + Ft).
Thus, from (117) POPt+1 = (1 + ￿)POPt.
Finally, note that it is not important that we model the shock to City 1￿ s income as
being relative to the average. Any stable distribution of income across cities will give rise
to a well-de￿ned distribution of alternative values for City 1 (although (115) will no longer
apply). A direct increase in City 1 income, e y1, will thus lead to entry for the same reasons
as before. Again, the magnitude of the response will be determined by the properties of
G(￿) in a neighborhold of " = e y1 along the balanced growth path.
Suppose now that the economy is subject to aggregate income shocks which a⁄ect all
cities symmetrically. Because utility is linear, adding a common component, yct, to city-
level income of the form,
e Yit = e yit + yct i = 1;:::;N (118)
will have no e⁄ect whatsoever, as it a⁄ects neither the ranking of cities by new entrants
or relocaters nor the demand for housing. Common shocks to construction costs and/or
population growth will a⁄ect housing markets within each city, but will have no e⁄ect on
mobility as they will not change the ranking of cities across prospective entrants as this is
determined only by the amenity distribution, F(￿).
10